Damon Wilson and David Kramer recently gave they account of how the United States pressure resulted in Belarus regime’s release of political prisoners. David Kramer was the key figure in George W Bush administration responsible for dealing with Belarus.
It is interesting to see different approaches of the United States with their principled stand and the Realpolitik of Germany. According to Wilson and Kramer, the German embassy in Minsk was trying to strike a deal with Belarus authorities to let Alexander Kazulin, a former Belarus presidential candidate, quietly go into voluntary exile. Kazulin rejected that offer and was subsequently released without any conditions following the US pressure.
Within two months of the asset freeze on Belneftekhim, an authoritative representative of the Lukashenka government quietly approached the U.S. Embassy in Minsk to ask what the American response would be if the regime released its political prisoners. Note that the regime approached the American embassy, not any European embassy, because it was the United States that kept ratcheting up the pressure against the government, backed up its threats when the regime continued to stall and whose political figures, from the President on down, used the bully pulpit to shine a light on authoritarianism and corruption in Belarus. Lukashenka and his cronies wanted to get out from under that bright light and free themselves from the pressure from sanctions, and the only way to do so was to release the political prisoners.
It is hard to say who will become Belarusian president after Lukashenka, but it is easy to predict what kind of political system will be left in Belarus. Although there was no massive violence, the authoritarian rule in Belarus has leveled the playing ground of Belarusian politics. Currently it looks more like a desert place with only primitive forms of political life.
Belarusian people are unfamiliar with political pluralism and open debated in public sphere. Most people know nothing about political movements and politicians except for Lukashenka. The parties established after the Soviet Union collapse enjoyed a short period of relative freedom and since late 1990s they do not play the role which parties usually play in democratic societies. A period of prolonged inactivity has weakened their structures, activists, as well as resulted in impoverishment of their professional and political skills.
The recent performance at the BBC’s ‘Hard Talk’ by an expected Belarusian presidential candidate demonstrated that if politicians stay for a while outside the public sphere it brings them no good. Speaking in London studio Mr. Andrei Sannikau stuck to old the motives of Belarusian opposition known from 1990s, which made him sound somehow anachronistic to those who follow events in Belarus.
Recent Russia-Belarus information conflict is still attracting attention of leading international media outlets. The latest dispute broke out in June when Russia and Belarus tussled over natural gas prices, and continued when Mr. Lukashenko nearly scuttled a planned customs union between his country, Russia and Kazakhstan that had been a pet project of Vladimir V. Putin, Russia’s prime minister and pre-eminent leader.
Michael Schwirtz of The New York Times* reflects on the mudslinging, which has played out in both countries’ government-controlled media in recent weeks.
In Information War, Documentary Is Latest Salvo By MICHAEL SCHWIRTZ
The New York Times
Published: July 31, 2010
MOSCOW — A new documentary film about the Belarussian president, Aleksandr G. Lukashenko, portrays him as a bumbling tyrant enamored of Hitler and Stalin. He has political opponents killed, journalists silenced and elections rigged in the film, all while keeping his faltering country locked in a Soviet time warp.
For years, human rights groups and Western governments have been leveling similar accusations. But the latest salvo against Mr. Lukashenko comes from an unlikely source: Russia’s government-controlled television.
Amnesty International has welcomed the release of Yevgeny Yakovenko, a conscientious objector who had been sentenced to one year in prison for “evading military service”. He was released under an amnesty marking the 65th anniversary of the end of the World War II.
Earlier this year two other conscientious objectors have been acquitted. In what appears to be a positive trend Belarusian conscientious objector Ivan Mikhailau has been acquitted of the charge of “evasion of conscription measures.” On 4 May, Ivan Mikhailau’s case was heard for a second time by Minsk Regional Court and he was found to be not guilty. Amnesty International had been vocal on his case. This was followed on 31 May by another acquittal of a conscientious objector. Dzmitry Smyk, a Jehovah’s Witness who had been charged with avoiding mandatory military service was acquitted by central court in the Belarusian city of Homel. The judge commented: “Smyk’s actions do not constitute a crime.”
David Marples, professor at the University of Alberta, Canada and a President of the North American Association for Belarusian Studies is on the research trip to Minsk right now. In the article for the Jamestown Foundation * he reflects on possible outcomes of the Belarusian presidential election of 2011. The expert is analyzing the most recent opinion poll results in order to support his predictions.
Prospects For Regime Change in Belarus
By: David Marples
The Jamestown Foundation
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 140
July 21, 2010
The approach of a new election always leads political analysts in Belarus to revisit a familiar question: is regime change possible or remote? Are Belarusians in general satisfied with the presidency of Alyaksandr Lukashenka? Will the current rift with Russia lead to the downfall of the leading politician in Belarus and, if so, who is likely to succeed him?
Andrej Sannikau, a potential candidate in 2011 Belarus presidential elections appeared on Hard Talk, the BBC World flagship current affairs interview programme.
Stephen Sackur, BBC journalist who interviewed Mr Sannikau has made a few “hard” points, in particular to Mr Sannikau’s own personality. The journalist correctly pointed out that Mr Sannikau does not represent any major political organization in Belarus, just a well-run web site. Mr Sannikau also appears as an intellectual detached from the Belarusian population and is likely to have more friends in the West than in Belarus.
Stephen Sackur also pointed out that the Belarus’ economy is better than Ukrrain’s and the regime in Minsk has not committed any serious human rights violations since 1990-s when several prominent opposition figures disappeared. Lukashenka also seems to remain popular and Belarus economy is becoming more open because of the privatisation process.
Sanniknau correctly explained that it was wrong to judge the regime’s popularity by looking at opinion polls. No access to electronic media by anyone other that the ruling regime means no real popularity for anyone else. He also correctly pointed out that it was misleading to compare Belarus to Ukraine which because Belarus was in a much better shape after collapse of the Soviet Union. Privatisation in Belarus is done in a non-transparent way which is unlikely to benefit either the Belarus population or will make the economy more liberal. Finally, Sannikau pointed out that the prospect of Belarus’ integration into Russia is supported neither by the vast majority of Belarus population, nor by Belarus regime nor opposition.
The Economist reports on the media war broken out between Belarus and Russia.
One good thing about what is going on is that for the first time the public in Belarus and Russia can hear basically the truth about the neighbour’s government. Belarusians can get truthful stories about problems with freedom of speech in today’s Russia (see a report by the Belarusian TV channel STV here). On the other side, Russian TV tells the truth about Aliaksandr Lukashenka in its scandalous documentary The Godfather.
Truth is such a rare thing for state media in authoritarian states like Russia and Belarus. Let’s hope we’ll see more of it as the conflict escalates.
RUSSIA and Belarus are unlikely champions of democracy and freedom of speech. But a postmodernist approach to politics can yield odd results in the post-Soviet world. In recent weeks these authoritarian regimes have denounced each other’s authoritarianism and deployed state-controlled media to attack each other’s lack of media freedom. Bizarrely, this war of words has been waged in the name of brotherly ties and economic union.
Poland and the Republic of Lithuania today officially celebrate the 600th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald.
On July 15, 1410, the united army of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania have defeated the Order of the Teutonic Knights in the well-known battle.
From 40 Lithuanian units at the battle 28, the overwhelming majority, were from the lands of modern Belarus and only 4 were from the territory of what is now the Republic of Lithuania.
For obvious reasons, the Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka has not been invited to the celebration. However, several hundred members of Belarusian history clubs have taken part in reconstruction of the battle.
Belarusian TV is this week broadcasting several historical documentaries about the battle. Belarus has today issued postage stamps commemorating the Battle of Grunwald. Interestingly, it is probably the first time since 1995 that the stamps feature Pahonia, the historical coat of arms of Belarus. Pahonia is a version of the emblem of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that has been replaced by the quasi-Soviet modern state emblem following a controversial referendum.
Polish and foreign heads of state have arrived at Grunwald, in northern Poland, to mark the 600th anniversary of the Polish-Lithuanian victory over the German order of Teutonic knights on July 15, in 1410.
After hearing an address by Polish President-elect Bronisław Komorowski, participants will lay wreaths at the battlefield and later visit the Teutonic Knight’s castle in Malbork.
Russian major television channel NTV featured a movie “The God Father”. The movie depicts the story of mysterious disappearances of major politicians in 1990s and other human rights violations committed in Belarus recently. The documentary also emphasizes that Russia has spent enormous amounts of money to support the Lukashenka regime. According to the movie, Russian subsidies is the main reason for the “Belarus economic wonder”.
The Belarusian president came in for some bruising criticism on 4 July, the official Belarus Independence Day, where he was portrayed as a dishonest, unscrupulous and ignorant dictator intent on holding onto power at all costs.
The God Father movie (available below in Russian) is a clear sign that the Kremlin wants to put pressure on Lukashenka in the wake of presidential elections in Belarus.
Ivan Mikhailov, Dmitry Smyk and Yevhen Yakovenko – the three young men convicted since late 2009 of refusing compulsory military service on grounds of conscience – separately told Forum 18 News Service* that they want the proposed new Alternative Service Law now being drafted to introduce a fully-civilian service, not of punitive length and open to all conscientious objectors, whether religious or not.
Mikhail Pashkevich of the group For Alternative Civilian Service insisted to Forum 18 that applicants for alternative civilian service should be able simply to inform the authorities of this decision without having to “prove” their entitlement. President Aleksandr Lukashenka’s instruction in February to draft Alternative Service Law came a decade after Belarus’ Constitutional Court ruled that introducing an alternative service was “urgent”.
BELARUS: Contradictory court rulings for conscientious objectors By Felix Corley
Forum 18 News Service
28 June 2010
The three conscientious objectors to compulsory military service sentenced under the Criminal Code since such prosecutions resumed in November 2009 have faced different outcomes, Forum 18 News Service has learnt. Messianic Jew Ivan Mikhailov was found guilty and imprisoned, but was freed days before the end of his three-month sentence. He was acquitted on retrial and the prosecutor’s appeal against this was rejected. He told Forum 18 he will seek compensation for his imprisonment.
It seems that pragmatism and realpolitik are winning at the moment over values-driven approaches in EU policy toward Belarus, while Lukashenka’s power game continues eroding the EU’s self-esteem. He is very well aware of the complicated procedural nature and internal problems of the EU and was not particularly shaken by the post-Lisbon proclamations that the EU would become a “more capable, more coherent and more strategic global actor.” In spite of the shifts in policy in his favor and high-level handshakes from various European figures, Lukashenka openly criticizes the EU, including its Eastern Partnership program, for not doing even more; meanwhile, he ignores diplomatic messages related to his behavior and the new wave of repression toward the media and civil society groups. In GMF’s On Wider Europe Series*, Pavol Demes argues that it is time to realize how President Lukashenka has outmaneuvered the EU, and time to shift to a policy that places more emphasis on civil society as a motor of future change.
On Wider Europe, June 18, 2010
Lukashenka needs to feel EU’s power by Pavol Demes
Due to ongoing and serious violations of human rights committed by the Lukashenka regime, in April 2010 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to suspend high-level contacts with the authorities in Belarus. This decision reinforced the conclusion that the European Union’s previous policy of engagement with President Aliaksandr Lukashenka had failed to lead to liberalization of his autocratic regime or real cooperation with the community of democracies. That policy of engagement was launched almost two years ago, in 2008, when European Union leaders, responding to the release of internationally recognized political prisoners, suspended sanctions imposed against key figures in Minsk. Member states, together with the new post-Lisbon EU representatives, will review their policy toward Belarus in the fall of 2010, but most observers doubt they will re-introduce strict conditionality toward the Belarusian regime.
As a result, Lukashenka will continue bluffing and benefiting in the absence of a coherent, effective EU policy. Meanwhile, the 10 million people of this post-Soviet nation will continue to suffer under Europe’s last dictator and will lose faith in receiving solidarity and support from the family of Western democracies.
How to deal with Belarus, along with the question of whether to engage or seek to isolate the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been a bone of contention in policy debates across the Atlantic. In 2008 the European Union concluded that the previous policy of isolation had failed, and it shifted to a policy of engagement. That policy, however, has thus far borne little fruit. In GMF’s On Wider Europe Series*, Sabine Fischer nevertheless argues that Belarus has no option in the long term but to deal with the EU, and that Brussels should show strategic patience and continue a long-term policy of multilateral engagement.
On Wider Europe, June 18, 2010
The EU and Belarus – Why Engage with a Troublemaker? by Sabine Fischer
Two years ago, in 2008, the European Union switched its policy course on Belarus. Frustrated with the lack of progress of its previous policy of isolation, it moved to engage with Belarus and the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. That policy has not led to the kind of success or improvements that were hoped for. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the only viable policy option in the face of the frustrating developments that ensued is a return to coercive diplomacy and isolation. This paper contends that further isolation of this eastern neighbor is dangerous and not in the interest of the EU. As will be argued below, Lukashenka’s search for a third way between Moscow and the West has no chance of succeeding. At the end of the day, the EU is Belarus’ only alternative when it comes to finding a more balanced position in Europe and to modernizing the Belarusian economy. Therefore, the EU should exercise strategic patience and continue to develop a multifaceted policy of engagement toward Belarus.