BELARUS DIGEST » security

Belarus to Sell 33 Fighter Jets to a Private Company

YK — Sat, 04 Sep 2010 11:20:07 +0000

Belarus is about to sign the world’s largest sale of fighter jets to a private company. ECA, a Netherlands-based company, is in talks to purchase 33 fighter jets from BelTechExport, a state-onwed Belarusian company. ECA plans to use the jets in Iceland as a mock enemy in military training exercises. The size of the deal is impressive – 33 fighter jets would be enough to fully equip army of a mid-sized European country.

According to Financial Times:

ECA has agreed to buy 15 Sukhoi Su-27 “Flanker” jets from BelTechExport, a Belarusian arms export company, with the option of 18 more. If completed, it would be the biggest sale of fighter aircraft to a private buyer and the first large-scale import of Russian-made warplanes into a Nato country. … the aircraft were originally made in Russia and will be “upgraded” in Belarus, with the first delivery in October.

Belarus is already one of the world’s largest military exporters. Although the country does not manufacture significant quantities of military equipment, it has old Soviet stocks and significant imports from Russia. In addition, 558 Aviation Repair Plant* is located near Baranavichy, in Western Belarus. The plant has wide experience of military technical collaboration with the foreign countries, and specializes in upgrading Soviet fighter jets.

However, the Baranavichy plant is not the main reason why Belarus is one of the world’s busiest arms exporters. It appears that Russian business groups are able to strike good deals with the leadership of Belarus when it comes to selling arms abroad. Avoiding taxes and public attention is crucial in this business. The deals are made in secret and their details are known only to a very limited number of people. So far, Belarus was known for sales to rough regimes such as Iran or Venezuella. Now the benefits of murky and non-transparent Belarus environment became evident to serious European customers.

If the deal goes through the $1.5bn most of the sale price paid by ECA is likely to end up in private coffers of well-connected entrepreneurs and government officials. It is unfortunate that neither Russian nor Belarusian tax payers are aware of such deals let alone benefit from them.

Role of the Military in Belarusian Foreign Policy

Wed, 30 Jun 2010 01:28:39 +0000

Belarus’ voice is seldom heard on the international scene, and its concerns are rarely taken into account. Minsk has not succeeded in achieving its major foreign policy goals and appears to lack an overall strategy. The much-disputed customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan, the feebleness of its military alliance, and its prospects for EU accession are three key examples of Belarus’ foreign policy failures.

Belarus seems to be seeking a “third way” between Moscow and the West, but it is doing so with essentially no international influence. Belarus has few levers to pull and little to bring to the negotiating table. The traditional currency of power in international relations is a strong military backed by a strong economy. Unfortunately for Belarus, it has neither. In order to successfully pursue an independent course in the international sphere, Belarus needs to get its economy on track, rethink its military posture and alliance affiliations, and modernize both its military structure and equipment.

Belarus’ 2009 defense budget was $611 million, which somehow financed an active force of 72,940 and a paramilitary force of 110,000. With a budget of $611 million, it is hard to imagine that Belarus could project a modicum of force beyond its borders or equip its soldiers with new weapons. Clearly, Belarus is unable to stand up to serious pressure from an external foe. To successfully embark on “a third way” in the international sphere, Minsk needs to develop the military power requisite with such a strategy.

Switzerland, for example, runs a strictly neutral and independent foreign policy, only contributing troops to peacekeeping and monitoring operations – currently 7 international missions. It has a robust territorial defense plan and an impressive logistical operation. It spent $4.51 billion on defense in 2009 and will spend another $4.9 billion in 2010. Switzerland’s 174,000 reserve force can be mobilized in the event of a crisis, and that force will be equipped with modern military hardware.

Switzerland’s fully capable military allows the country neutrality and independence in its foreign policy decision making, and its military is supported by a $532 billion GDP. It stood up to the German War Machine in World War II, and will not easily cave to future external pressure.

Belarus, on the other hand, would have to spend 13.3% of its GDP to equal Swiss annual defense expenditures, which would bring it to a level not seen since days of the Soviet Union. The key then to independence in Belarusian foreign policy lies in the economy. Until Belarus can significantly raise its $60 billion annual GDP to support a modern, fully equipped military, it will not likely be able to run an independent foreign policy able to withstand external pressure.

Belarusian military forces are deployed in a defensive posture that aligns with the military doctrine of the Republic. The military’s purpose is to guarantee the inviolability of Belarusian borders and to prevent foreign invasion. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to assess that the Belarusian defense budget and force posture align well. It does not take a lot of money to fund domestic troop deployments where little is spent in the way of new platforms and military infrastructure.

A military posture centered on strict territorial defense works for a country such as Switzerland that is self-sufficient and runs a historically neutral and independent foreign policy. But for Belarus, which is not quite neutral and hardly self-sufficient, a single-track defense posture, supported by an antiquated and under-funded military is not requisite to achieving foreign policy goals, as it gives the country no bargaining power and likely would not stand up to outside pressure. Instead, Belarus should consider aligning itself militarily more closely with Europe – and of course economically.

Yes, close military alignment with Europe is a euphemism for increasing cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the prospect of eventually gaining full membership status. Participation in the military alliance would begin a process of gaining international credibility for Belarus, as NATO assistance would eventually lead to a complete overhaul of Belarusian force posture, structure, and equipment.

As a member of the world’s most powerful military alliance, Belarus would be able to effectively contribute to global security by participating in peacekeeping, counter-terror, counter-proliferation, and stabilization operations around the globe. NATO’s new strategic concept, that is currently being developed, could see the Alliance expand its role as a caretaker of global security, and Belarus would gain much by becoming a contributing member.

Currently, Belarus is a long way from qualifying for NATO military assistance, let alone a membership action plan; however, the Alliance eventually expanding to cover the entirety of Europe is not beyond the realm of possibility. There are even credible voices now and again calling for Russian NATO membership.

Belarus essentially has two choices if it would like to get its foreign policy on track and begin to achieve some goals: it can open its economy to massive foreign investment, increasing its GDP and allowing it to develop the type of military commensurate with a self-sufficient state that is capable of pursuing a sometimes unilateral course of action, or it can work to more closely align itself with a capable military alliance that would help to modernize Belarusian force posture, structure, and equipment.

Belarus’ current alliance affiliations and dependence on Russia give it little international leverage, and it has effectively alienated itself from the West due to political considerations. Yet, Belarus does not have the economic or military power to unilaterally achieve major foreign policy goals. Minsk would be well advised to adopt a strategy of closer economic and military cooperation with Europe, and eventually across the Atlantic, which would be in the best interests of its military, the state, and its citizens.

*Data on defense data taken from:
The Military Balance 2010, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, England.

by Andrew Riedy, Contributing Writer

To Engage or Not to Engage: The Policy Dilemma of Dealing with Belarus

slava — Mon, 21 Jun 2010 14:32:48 +0000

How to deal with Belarus, along with the question of whether to engage or seek to isolate the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been a bone of contention in policy debates across the Atlantic. In 2008 the European Union concluded that the previous policy of isolation had failed, and it shifted to a policy of engagement. That policy, however, has thus far borne little fruit. In GMF’s On Wider Europe Series*, Sabine Fischer nevertheless argues that Belarus has no option in the long term but to deal with the EU, and that Brussels should show strategic patience and continue a long-term policy of multilateral engagement.

On Wider Europe, June 18, 2010

The EU and Belarus – Why Engage with a Troublemaker?
by Sabine Fischer

Two years ago, in 2008, the European Union switched its policy course on Belarus. Frustrated with the lack of progress of its previous policy of isolation, it moved to engage with Belarus and the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. That policy has not led to the kind of success or improvements that were hoped for. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the only viable policy option in the face of the frustrating developments that ensued is a return to coercive diplomacy and isolation. This paper contends that further isolation of this eastern neighbor is dangerous and not in the interest of the EU. As will be argued below, Lukashenka’s search for a third way between Moscow and the West has no chance of succeeding. At the end of the day, the EU is Belarus’ only alternative when it comes to finding a more balanced position in Europe and to modernizing the Belarusian economy. Therefore, the EU should exercise strategic patience and continue to develop a multifaceted policy of engagement toward Belarus.

The EU needs to do so in spite of the fact that things are clearly not improving in Belarus. Local elections held on April 25 have dashed hopes that Minsk would finally allow for a freer and fairer ballot. A few steps were made in this direction at the beginning of 2010 by changing the electoral law, admitting more opposition representatives to the electoral commissions, and liberalizing the registration of candidates as well as the conditions for the election campaign. This proved to be a smokescreen, however, and the election turned out to be heavily manipulated. Repression of opposition candidates and pressure on independent media were reported. Moreover, new legislation — notably the entering into force of a new law on political parties and a decree on the regulation of the national segment of the internet — provided the government with more tools to diminish dissident political forces’ maneuvering space. Since autumn 2009 pressure on civil society organizations has increased, possibly due to the active role of Belarusian participants in the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, which met for the first time in November 2009.

Minsk and Brussels have also argued over the former’s crackdown on the Union of Poles in Belarus and the latter’s attitude toward the participation of the Belarusian Parliament in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. Economic liberalization measures remain hesitant and shallow and lag far behind commitments made to the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. Up until now Minsk has successfully ignored EU demands for domestic changes. Instead it tries to reach out to third countries such as Venezuela and China, so as to compensate for the loss of Russian economic subsidies. A recent oil deal with Venezuela and Lukashenka’s conspicuous absence during Russian Prime Minister Putin’s visit to Belarus in March were blunt signals to Moscow that Minsk does not fancy a privileged partnership à la russe anymore. For the past few months, Lukashenka has been looking for a third way that would allow him to avoid the costs that rapprochement with the EU would imply.

The political leadership in Minsk has thus demonstrated once again that even though modest changes have been introduced over the past few years, its single most important goal is the preservation of its own power. This is an extraordinarily frustrating insight for the EU. After years of isolation and mutual resentment, Brussels had finally set out to substantially change its policy and attitude toward Minsk. In autumn 2008 the Council of the European Union restored dialogue with the Belarusian authorities and suspended a travel ban affecting 37 Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenka. This move was a reaction to the release of the last political prisoner in Belarus. In August 2008 the Russian-Georgian war had shed glaring light on the urgency of greater EU engagement in its eastern neighborhood. Moreover, before the war there already had been growing awareness inside the EU that its sanctions against Belarus had failed to deliver the desired results. Since October 2008 the European Council has prolonged the suspension of the sanctions twice. The EU will have to decide on the sanction regime again in December 2010, only weeks away from the Belarusian presidential elections. It is very unlikely that the next few months will bring a change in domestic developments within Belarus. On the contrary, with the election campaign looming there is clearly a danger that the situation in the country will even further deteriorate.

One might argue that this résumé of recent developments proves the bankruptcy of the EU’s efforts at engagement and that the only viable policy option is a return to isolation and coercive diplomacy. However, that would be a mistake, since further isolation of this eastern neighbor of the EU is not in the EU’s interest.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the only viable policy option in the face of the frustrating developments of the past year is a return to coercive diplomacy and isolation. At the end of the day, the EU is Belarus’ only alternative. . . Therefore, the EU should exercise strategic patience and continue to develop a multifaceted policy of engagement towards Belarus.

Since the suspension of the ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Minsk and Brussels in 1997, the EU’s policy toward Belarus has been a mixture of coercive and open diplomacy. However, until 2007–08 the coercive approach clearly dominated. After almost a decade and a half, most actors inside the European Union acknowledge that this policy failed, thus depriving the EU of any leverage for influencing domestic developments in Belarus, and locking it in into a maximalist logic of coercion. In spite of the limited results of the current policy of engagement, this is why any return to an isolation policy should be resisted. Any consideration of the EU’s future policy toward Belarus should start from the assumption that sanctions have failed as an appropriate instrument for opening Belarus toward the EU, however difficult it may now seem to find a way out of the current situation.
The EU has an interest in an open relationship with Minsk for various reasons. Since the 2004 enlargement it has shared borders with Belarus. Not only is there a general interest in the security of these borders, but also Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia each have an interest in undisturbed economic and societal interaction across their borders with Belarus. Furthermore, Belarus plays an important role as a transit country for trade between the EU and Russia, notably in oil and gas. Good governance and domestic stability in Belarus, as well as a smooth functioning of the triangular relationship between Minsk, Brussels, and Moscow is of great importance to ensure EU energy security. Ultimately, the goal of the EU’s specially designed policy instruments is to deepen its relations with its eastern neighbors and to integrate them politically and economically. This goal is difficult to achieve if not all of the neighbors are on board. Transforming Belarus from a “blind spot” into a partner is even more important now that Ukraine seems to be at least partly reorienting its foreign policy.

Hence, the EU needs to find ways to engage with Belarus. Given the attitude of the authorities in Minsk, however, this engagement has to be nuanced and subtle. A closer look at domestic developments over the past few years highlights a number of processes under way that have the potential for irreversible change and, consequently, could pave the way toward political reform. An EU policy of engagement should continue to try to build on these processes.

First, the siloviki, who had dominated the political scene in Belarus for more than a decade, have been systematically removed from their positions during the past three years. They have been replaced by younger political actors associated with Lukashenka’s son Viktor Lukashenka, as well as by a group of economic nationalists and technocrats aligned with Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky. The political system remains controlled by President Lukashenka, but he is now surrounded by political figures with a different understanding of the country’s economic situation and more will to reform. This is not to say that these forces are interested in democratic political transformation. Most of them would certainly subscribe to the preservation of the current political system. But their presence in the bureaucratic hierarchies can provide a toehold for external actors such as the EU to support reform of the Belarusian economy.

Secondly, the Belarusian population has developed certain expectations regarding consumption and living standards. Thanks to the Russian energy subsidies that have kept the economy going for the past decade, living standards throughout the country have risen considerably. This Belarusian “economic miracle” has provided the most important power base for Lukashenka. Its foundation is dwindling now, however, due to the deterioration of Belarus’ relations with Russia. Since the Belarusian leadership has relied on access to cheap Russian energy and missed the opportunity to reinvest revenues in the modernization of its own economy, it will find it difficult now to maintain its “social contract” with the general population without external support. At the same time, pressure from below will increase as living conditions deteriorate.

Thirdly, there are civil society actors whom the EU can reach out to in order to build closer links with Belarusian society and create a stronger basis for good governance and, ultimately, democratization. Belarusian civil society has experienced a difficult period of repression during the past 15 years. This has forced the existing nongovernmental organizations to retreat to non-political areas of activity, notably in the social sphere, and to operate in a very strategic and efficient way so as to be able to survive. As a result, there are professional and highly committed NGOs in Belarus, which can be a target point for increased EU support for civil society.

The independence of the Belarusian state and culture has become the leitmotif of Lukashenka’s policy throughout the past ten years, and this has been increasingly embraced by Belarusian society. For a certain period the government was able to strike a precarious balance between its ideology of independence and its overdependence on Russian subsidies. These subsidies, however, came with political strings attached, and Minsk found itself increasingly confronted with Russian attempts to curtail Belarusian sovereignty. When it realized this, it started to open up to the European Union.

The past year has proven, however, that this move was tactically and geopolitically motivated at best. As more engagement with the EU also comes with (albeit different) political strings attached, Minsk has moved on in its search for alternatives. Its prospects of success, however, are extremely limited. Most of the countries with which Belarus is trying to become more engaged are much more interested in having functioning relations with Russia. Their rapprochement with the authorities in Minsk a few years ago was, if anything, a sign of good will toward Moscow.

Certainly Venezuela has an economic interest in the oil deal concluded with Belarus this spring. But it will watch its relations with Russia very carefully and will not allow this to have a negative impact on them. The same goes for other extra-regional actors — let alone the little sense all this makes for the sustainable development of the Belarusian economy. It is highly unlikely that China will become more deeply involved in the Belarusian economy due to the sheer lack of promising investment opportunities. Last but not least, the Yanukovych administration in Kyiv will do nothing to support Belarus’ attempts to strive for independence from Moscow. Minsk will have a difficult time finding third countries that could balance and substitute for Russia, or the EU, as major foreign partners.

Against this rather bleak background, what options does Lukashenka actually have? A lot of distrust has accumulated between the Russian and Belarusian leaderships. Russia’s current effort to make Ukraine under Yanukovych the new “model pupil” in its western neighborhood gives ample proof of that. What is more, the Belarusian authorities would find it difficult to sell a “return to Russia” at home given the change of attitudes both among elites and in the population at-large. Simply turning back the clock, therefore, is not a viable option. Whereas economic overdependence on Russia will persist, Minsk’s only real alternative for finding a more balanced position is and remains the European Union.

For the EU, the question of how to deal with Belarus after the hopeful start in 2008 and the subsequent disappointments is clearly a tricky one. The past few months have made it clear that the EU still needs a mix of coercive and open diplomacy, but it should definitely prioritize the latter in its approach toward Belarus. Basically, the EU should base its policy on two pillars.

It should, first, continue its course of cautious opening toward the government and clearly spell out the incentives it has to offer. These range from the institutionalization and legalization of the relationship through the ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, to the launching of negotiations for an ENP Action Plan to Belarus’ full integration in the Eastern Partnership initiative. This would make the country fully eligible for funds from the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, the European Investment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Brussels could start by lifting the sanctions in December 2010 and unblocking the contractual basis of the relationship, which is seen by many as a precondition for Belarus’ integration into the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). This would not cost the EU much, but would demonstrate its will for substantial change. Any further steps should then be made conditional upon tangible improvement in Belarus’ domestic political, economic, and human rights situation, particularly with a view to the upcoming presidential elections.

Secondly, in addition to engaging the government of Belarus, the EU should also reach out to and engage with Belarusian society more than it has done so far. Active Belarusian participation in the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum showed that civil society actors perceive this as an opportunity to make their case and strengthen their position inside the country. More steps in this direction should be taken. The EU should use all the instruments at its disposal to support civil society organizations in Belarus. Given the specific features of Belarusian civil society, the target group for external support should be as broad as possible and include NGOs working in the social and cultural spheres as well as political NGOs. Later on, NGOs should be given an active role in negotiations on an ENP Action Plan and on the conditions of Belarus’ involvement in the EaP. The ENP has often been criticized for being government-oriented and for not paying enough attention to civil society. In the case of Belarus it is particularly important to find a better balance between governmental authorities and civil society.

Most importantly, the EU should without further ado open negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement with Belarus. This issue should be dealt with separately and should not be subject to conditionality. It provides the EU with a unique opportunity to send out a positive political message to Belarusian society and to pave the way for the intensification of people-to-people contacts.

Such a multifaceted approach would help the EU engage both with the government and with Belarusian society as a whole, and move from negative to positive conditionality. Such an approach has a much better chance of eventually promoting positive change within Belarus than returning to the failed policy of isolation. At the end of the day, Belarus does not have much of an alternative to intensifying relations with the EU. The authorities in Minsk will experience increasing pressure from below when it becomes obvious that an improvement in relations with the EU depends on Minsk — and not on Brussels.

Dr Sabine Fischer is a senior research fellow at the European Union Institute for security Studies in Paris where she deals with the European Union’s eastern neighborhood and Russia. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).

VB

As Violence Grows Regional Security Organisations Fail to Make Kyrgyzstan Secure

YK — Tue, 15 Jun 2010 07:37:11 +0000

Regional security organisations prove to be remarkably inefficient as the ethnic violence unfolds in Kyrgystan. This country is Central Asia is a member of a half a dozen of regional organisations and none of them is willing to intervene. Over a hundred is already reported dead and tens of thousands of refugees are trying to flee Kyrgyzstan.

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are just a few of security blocks to which Kyrgystan belongs. Apparently, these organisations exist primarily for geopolitical manoeuvring and staging military games rather than for ensuring security.

The former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev is now a political refugee in Minsk, the capital of another dysfunctional organisation – the Commonwealth of Independent States. Bakiyev keeps repeating that the Kyrgystan interim government led by Roza Otunbayeva cannot control the country. He fiercely denies accusations that his close associates are involved of instigating violence between the Kyrgyz majority and the Uzbek minority in the south of Kyrgyzstan.

Under personal protection of Alexander Lukashenka, a Belarus authoritarian ruler who has been in power since early 1990-s Kurmanbek Bakiyev feels more secure than a few months ago when he had to flee Kyrgystan. The whereabouts of his son Maxim were unknown until yesterday when he was detained in a London airport where he arrived on a private jet. Under arrest in England Maxim Bakiyev will be much safer than many of his compatriots in Kyrgyzstan torn by violence.

The passive idleness of regional security organisations in Central Asia is worrying. It is one thing to not to intervene when public protests are taking place and the political regimes change, for bad or for good. It is another thing to observe ethnic violence to unfold when hundreds are being slaughtered. The Dutch peacekeepers failed to intervene when thousands of men and boys were massacred in Srebrenica fifteen years ago. The world has a long memory for such atrocities but also a remarkable inability to learn the lessons and to act until it is too late.

Belarusian HEU: Lukashenka’s Ace up the Sleeve

Fri, 11 Jun 2010 01:04:41 +0000

Belarusian highly enriched uranium (HEU) has not received a significant amount of attention apart from within small policy circles. Belarus was not invited to the high-profile Nuclear Security Summit this spring in Washington, nor has it had much of a relationship with the United States over the last couple years. One is hard pressed to think of what Belarus and the U.S. even have in common. It is hard to negotiate when the interests of two countries don’t seemingly overlap. However, nuclear material is one area where some common ground can be found between the United States and Belarus.

Taking into account the uranium enrichment activities of Iran and the renewed belligerence of North Korea, Belarusian HEU has all but disappeared from the political radar. Nonetheless, the material could be a potential ace-up-the-sleeve for President Alyaeksander Lukashenka if played wisely. The HEU could be used to both garner high-level attention from the United States, and to improve any future Belarusian negotiating position, at least in the short to mid-term.

There is a time limit on the ability of Belarus, or any other country for that matter, to secure the maximum benefits that would accompany surrendering its HEU stock in order to be down-blended, rendering it less dangerous. The President of the United States has made securing and consolidating nuclear material a key priority of his administration’s non-proliferation agenda. Indeed, the agency in charge of administering nuclear security programs is likely to receive a 13.4% budget increase over last year.

However, not everyone in the U.S. government shares the President’s fervor, as evidenced by the reluctance and often hostility of the U.S. Republican party to the President’s agenda. It is likely that a future Republican administration will be loath to offer the same terms in a negotiation with Belarus, and will more likely resort to strong-arming in the case that it sees Belarusian HEU as a threat. Therefore, it is highly recommended that if Belarus would like to improve its international standing and gain the optimum benefits for its immediately-valuable HEU, it should pursue an open and high-level dialogue with the United States over the repatriation of its HEU stocks to Russia for downblending.

Securing loose nuclear material that could fall into the hands of terrorists or a nation seeking nuclear weapon capability is a top priority of the Obama administration. It was the focus of the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, which brought together the leaders of 47 nations to discuss the nature of the threat posed by loose nuclear material and to foster a consensus aimed at addressing the problem. The Nuclear Security Summit was also a key element of a larger U.S. effort to reduce the global threats posed by nuclear weapons, and as such, the Obama administration has invested significant political capital in the pursuit of its nonproliferation agenda.

Noticeably absent from the April summit was Belarusian President Lukashenka. Belarus is thought to have between 170-370 kg of fresh – nonirradiated – HEU, 40 kg of which is said to be weapons-grade – enriched to 90% or higher. The material is said to be stored at Sosny, 10 miles outside of Minsk, which is the home of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences and a Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research. The HEU at Sosny, while inherently dangerous, is not exactly the “loose” nuclear material that an international consensus has been built around securing. But even though Minsk’s possession of HEU doesn’t exactly pose the greatest threat to international security and stability, Minsk can still capitalize on its large stocks to gain political and economic benefits by recognizing that the current U.S. administration would love to chalk up another foreign policy win.

To its credit, Belarus has been a rather responsible member of the nuclear nonproliferation regime since its ratification of the Treaty of the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its co-sponsorship of the indefinite NPT extension proposal in 1995. Belarusian participation in the now-famous efforts to consolidate the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, its 2005 signature of the Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement (not in force as of 27 May 2010), and its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty are indicative of its understanding of the need to control nuclear weapons and material.

Its efforts should be commended, but as the saying goes, “the squeaky wheel gets the grease.” If Belarus wants to be perceived as a responsible steward of its nuclear material by keeping it secure, then kudos to Belarus. But if it would like to receive some tangible benefits, then it would be well advised to capitalize on the current attention that the U.S. administration’s non-proliferation agenda is receiving. At a time when U.S.-Belarusian relation are at a very low point, this issue could be used to ease the tension and allow the two countries to begin normalizing relations, which would be in both of their interests.

If Belarus could leverage the Obama Administration’s desire to pick up what would likely be perceived as a big foreign policy win before the next U.S. Presidential election in 2012, it could further its own goals and effectively contribute to global security. The U.S. administration’s elevation of nuclear material security to a top-priority would allow for Minsk to garner positive notoriety and financial gain. The state of U.S.-Belarusian has nearly bottomed out and could use the adrenaline shot that working together to repatriate the Belarusian nuclear material would provide.

If Lukashenka is to garner the optimum benefit from his HEU stockpile, it will have to be before there is a change of administration in the White House. The U.S. Presidential election in 2012 is likely going to be quite contentious, and if the opposition party comes to power, many of Obama’s policies will likely be discontinued. If Belarus would like to continue to be a responsible steward of its significant quantities of HEU, that is great, but it should understand that such dangerous material can also be a liability.

by Andrew Riedy, contributing writer

Venezuela’s Oil May Help Belarus Make Friends

Thu, 03 Jun 2010 20:55:53 +0000

This year Europe will purchase its first oil products from Venezuelan crude refined in Belarusian Mozyr. While Belarusian citizens have a hard time obtaining visas and traveling, Belarusian oil products traverse borders freely and are welcome in the EU regardless of the state of Belarus’ civil society or its human rights situation. The Belarus-Venezuela project, whatever its economic feasibility, may help Minsk get on better terms with its immediate neighbors (perhaps with the exception of Russia) and decrease its reliance on Moscow.

In fact, precisely because the route for delivering Venezuelan oil is so long and tortuous, Belarus is forced to cooperate with Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and other countries on delivering it. The first 80,000-ton “trial” crude was shipped via Ukraine’s Odessa port and then by the rail to the Mozyr refinery. Other transporting possibilities include utilizing Ukraine’s Odessa-Brody pipeline or Lithuanian (Klaipeda), Latvian (Ventspils) or Polish (Gdansk) ports.

While the logistical and financial aspects of the project are being criticized – especially in the Russian press, – and its profitability and efficiency indeed warrant caution, the project may bring Belarus closer to its neighbors that already offer assistance. For example, Lithuanian Prime Minister said that the project of transiting Venezuelan oil through Lithuania was “doable” and that Vilnius could even offer Minsk a discounted tariff rate. Similarly, Ukrainian Prime Minister said that the Venezualan oil project could lead to the “mutually beneficial agreements” between Minsk and Kiev and that Ukraine could provide Minsk with transportation discounts.

The first oil was produced by the JV Petrolera, and another JV will be set up to supervise the sales, with Minsk having a 25 percent stake in the venture. Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Hugo Chavez plan to invest at least $8 billion into developing the oil fields by 2025 and are also considering cooperating in the gas industry.

With the terms of Russian oil deliveries to Belarus changing this year, importing oil from outside Russia becomes more economically feasible despite the distance. Moreover, oil tanker shipments cover vast distances on a daily basis, and states like China, India and Japan all buy Venezuelan oil.

Venezuela’s heavy oil of the so-called Santa Barbara blend can produce 20 percent more gasoline, kerosene, or diesel fuel than Russian blends and is in high demand in the EU. Because this type of oil requires rather specific processing technologies, Belarus’ expertise and its products will be welcome in the European markets.

Belarus could import up to 4 million tons of Venezuelan crude, one fifth of what it imports from Russia, diversifying and securing its energy supplies. Minsk is also cooperating with Iran and looking into obtaining oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

How Low Can Minsk Go for Cheaper Energy?

Sun, 30 May 2010 20:37:32 +0000

To lower the price of Russian energy Belarus has tried pleas, threats, promises, and blackmail. Minsk set lowering the cost of imported energy as a condition to joining the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan and last week went as far as to offer to give Russian firms control over its energy assets.

Having accused Russia of trying to subdue Belarus by acquiring its key industrial assets, Minsk is nevertheless ready to cede control of the gas pipeline operator Beltransgaz (of which Russian Gazprom already owns 50%) and the Mozyr oil refinery in return for oil and gas supplies at Russian domestic prices.

Luckily, Igor Sechin, Putin’s deputy in charge of energy, was not thrilled with Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s proposal. Sechin said Belarus would have to clear its outstanding debt of $200 million before any deal can be considered.

All these last-ditch efforts not to pay the true cost of energy would do is allow Belarus’ Soviet-style economy to continue in its tracks without a serious reform until the next energy crisis hits. While without the duty-free oil and gas, joining the Customs Union hardly makes economic sense for Minsk, there is even less economic sense in ceding control of Belarus’ energy infrastructure.

Everything has a price: if not paid right away, then paid later — with interest. Unless they are willing to trade their independence for a temporary discount, states have to buy energy at the global market costs.

Looking back at Minsk’s numerous attempts to get on brotherly terms with Moscow hoping for some nepotistic economic relationship, one sees that the struggling Customs Union project may well be the beginning of the end of several unsuccessful integration projects in the post-Soviet space, including the Union State between Russia and Belarus and their single economic space.

Since the uncivilized nepotistic ways are failing, it is high time for Belarus to resort to more civilized forms of international economic relations by initiating a full-scale economic reform, strengthening political and economic ties with the European Union, and catching up on the alternative energy solutions.

If the energy issues are as important as Belarus’ efforts on that front suggest, then it is definitely not in Minsk’s interest to cede control of this important strategic asset to Russia, even if “for decent money,” as the Belarusian President hopes.

The loss of control over its energy transit and refinery system will result in the loss of the only bargaining chip Minsk has while securing Russia’s gas supply routes to the European market.

Western Myths about Belarus

YK — Sun, 23 May 2010 16:48:24 +0000

Belarus Digest has prepared a compilation of misconceptions against Belarus which many Westerners share:

Is Belarus far from Europe?

Belarus is actually in the geographical center of Europe (Perhaps put in the coordinates because it really is right in the middle: The exact geographical centre of Europe is located in Polotsk 55°30′0″N 28°48′0″E. The closest European capital, Vilnius, is just two hours drive from Minsk, the center of Belarus. The capital of Belarus is less than two hours flight from Berlin, less than three hours from London and around one hour flight from Warsaw or Moscow.

Is the word “Belarus” translated as “White Russia”?

Read the rest of this entry »

Musing about Nuclear Security on the Banks of Prypyat

Fri, 16 Apr 2010 19:10:27 +0000

Efficiency of official gatherings is often reversely proportional to the number of people invited. This rule held true even for the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC Apr. 12-13. Hosting 47 nations without singling out any of them was a feat accomplished not only at the expense of traffic disruptions inconveniencing DC residents, but also at the expense of meaningful and binding commitments. But even then, some states felt left out – by not being invited in the first place. As expected, Belarus was among the latter cohort, which included such debonair international actors as Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuella.

While it’s “sister-nation” Ukraine basked in the fame of its “landmark decision” to get rid of all of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) by 2012, Minsk was vying for attention by brandishing the HEU stocks it intends to keep.

“We still have highly enriched uranium. Hundreds of kilograms of… weapons-grade and less-enriched uranium,” said Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. He complained of being “pushed to the wall” to remove the HEU and said “[n]obody will be allowed to make Belarus bow down.” “Let us sit at the negotiation table and decide what to do with this big amount of enriched uranium,” he said, clearly upset for not being invited to the big kids’ table.

Such comments would be quite jarring at the Summit, but, of course, the leader was not invited to Washington. In fact, hosting Lukashenka in the United States would mean endorsing his human and civil rights record and creating a dangerous precedent for other nondemocratic regimes with Uranium-inflated egos.

Echoing his own comments from more than a decade ago, Lukashenka said Belarus’ decision to give up the nuclear weapons left on it territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a “severe mistake.” Back then, the newly elected anti-corruption warrior was to carry out the 1994 agreement to hand over all nuclear weapons to Russia, concluded by his predecessor Stanislav Shushkevich. As expected, Lukashenka’s impltementation did not go without a snag: in 1995, he suspended the transfer of weapons; in January 1996, he said that NATO action may force Belarus to redeploy nuclear weapons; in 1999, when NATO forces entered Kosovo, he called the decision to withdraw weapons “a crude mistake, if not a crime.”

Thus, to Lukashenka’s credit, in more than 15 years of his rule, he has been remarkably consistent on his views on nuclear weapons, unlike many of his critics. He followed the same policy line when saying that the Soviet arsenal should have been sold rather than given up for free as well as when ready to welcom Russian nuclear missiles on the Belarusian territory at the height of the US-Russian dispute over European missile defense system.

It is quite fascinating to compare the dynamics of compliance and disarmament by Belarus and Ukraine, whose destinies have been intertwined throughout history and whose similarities led social scientists to call them sisters. Both countries were affected by the Chernobyl nuclear incident and shared anti-nuclear consensus prior to independence. Their views on the nuclear issue diverged when the Soviet Union dissolved, however.

Dutiful Belarus continued to trudge along the disarmament path once the Soviet Union collapsed and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 1993. In fact, Minsk was proud to have been the first former Soviet state to join the nonproliferation regime and celebrated the removal of weapons with pomp. Compensation for giving up the nuclear weapons was never on top of Minsk’s agenda, although it was eventually rewarded for its compliance.

By contrast, Ukraine’s frequent suspension of the weapons transfer process gave Russian and American policymakers numerous reasons to worry. For example, in 1992, Kiev took ownership of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, claiming that it was created with the resources of many republics and, therefore, belonged to all of them. The Ukrainian Rada deputies repeatedly rejected the NPT, kept demanding greater security guarantees and greater compensation, and eventually threatened to retain the weapons or even sell them to the highest bidder. Notably, Kiev’s troublemaking paid off; the “problem child” Ukraine was handsomely rewarded for the arsenal it neither controled nor had built.

It is fascinating to observe that Belarus’ and Ukraine’s views on the nuclear issue remain nearly opposite to each other; only the republics’ views seem to have traded places in the course of their independent histories. In the 1990s, it was Ukraine that threatened to “auction off nuclear weapons to the highest bidder if no agreement could be reached” while Bellarus was an exemplary state adhering to international norms. Today, the Belarusian leader is as if reading from the 1994 script of the Ukrainian opposition while Ukraine is applauded for its commitment to nuclear security at the Summit.

One thing has not changed at all since the early 1990s, however. Just like 15 years ago, it is Ukraine and not Belarus that is making headlines in Western papers. For better or worse, the Belarusian President is currently heard only in his own neighborhood.

Is waving the Belarusian HEU in front of Brussels’ and Washington’s noses a smart move on Lukashenka’s part? However barbaric it may seem, it is often only by scaring the global community with large HEU stocks that Belarus can get attention from Europe and the United States. One may only wonder what the country’s future would look like and whether the West would chose the same neglectful policy line, had the country insisted on keeping the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory up to this day.

Russia’s New Military Doctrine Mentions Belarusian Security

Sun, 07 Feb 2010 22:21:49 +0000

On February 5, 2010 President Dmitri Medvedev approved a new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The document replaces the version adopted in 2000 and will serve as a frame of reference for the Russian military through 2020.

Among other things, the doctrine addresses the security of the so-called Union State of Belarus and Russia. According to the text of the doctrine, Russia “considers an armed attack on the state-participant in the Union State, as well as all other actions involving the use of military force against it, as an act of aggression against the Union State, and it will take measures in response.”

The new doctrine provides that Russia’s main priorities for its military-political cooperation with the Republic of Belarus are the following:

(a) coordinating efforts in developing the national armed forces and using military infrastructure;

(b) developing and coordinating measures toward maintaining the defense capabilities of the Union State in accordance with the Military Doctrine of the Union State.

According to the new doctrine, Russia can use nuclear weapons in response to the use of any types of weapons of mass destruction against itself or its allies. However, the doctrine does not provide for pre-emptive nuclear strikes. In fact, it reduces Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons, contrary to the predictions and concerns raised in the Western media throughout 2009.

The doctrine names the expansion of NATO first in a list of major external threats to Russia. Commenting on the reflection of Russia’s threat assessment in the new doctrine NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told Reuters that the document “does not reflect the real world” and that “NATO is not an enemy of Russia.”

Read the full text of the doctrine in Russian.