Some countries of the former Soviet Union and Africa celebrate March 8 as the International Women’s Day. This is perhaps the most “innocent” Soviet holiday which has not yet disappeared from our calendar.

February 23 (originally Day of the Soviet Army), which in recent years actively establishes itself as a male counterpart of March 8, or, even more, November 7 (Day of the October Revolution) are highly politicized holidays. Therefore the tradition of celebrating them will disappear as soon the government takes a rational view on what should be celebrated as the Day of the Belarusian army. An even bigger question is whether it is worth for Belarus to celebrate anniversaries of the October revolution at all.

March 8 is the only holiday which has no blood on it. It does not carry all these second-thoughts like holidays associated with the liberation of Belarus from Nazi occupation and the restoration of the Soviet dictatorship after that.

Nevertheless, the modern tradition of celebrating March 8 is an excellent example of how the Soviet government has been able to indoctrinate socialist ideology and system of symbols in the people’s everyday life. The struggle against religion plus a massive urbanization caused the rapid loss of many folk traditions in Belarus. To replace rural traditions there came official Soviet holidays: New Year, the eighth of March, twenty-third day of February, the Seventh of November.

March 8 originally arose as a day of women’s emancipation. It was a celebration of women’s struggle for their rights and against their traditional role in family and society. Instead of Kinder, Küche, Kirche women demanded things that are obvious today: the right to participate in elections, better working conditions, better wages.

On the other hand, after eight decades of celebrating March 8, the people’s culture has indeed transformed the feminist holiday into a patriarchal one.

The modern image of a woman you congratulate on March 8 is no way the image of an emancipated courageous female proletarian. 8 March is an occasion to congratulate your mother or your loved, but not a battle comrade.

According to the tradition of the last decades, on March 8 men promise to protect women and care for them. Women, in turn, should kindly allow them to do so. Men demonstrate features of knights and gentlemen, and women demonstrate those of noble ladies. A completed patriarchal idyll.

As a celebration of emancipation March 8 has turned into its opposite – a celebration of femininity and motherhood. Such is the irony of fate. Post-Soviet feast of March 8 counters the views of both conservatives (as a secularized and communist holiday) and feminists (as day of knighthood and care for the ladies).

Day on March 8 became something like a Soviet version of Valentine’s Day. After the collapse of the communist dictatorship it has become one more traditional shopping race for members of the consumerist society and just an other cause for good of human emotions. Maybe it is better this way.

by Alexander Čajčyc for Naša Niva

Read the original story in Belarusian

Belarusian society is deeply split. Less than a decade after the establishment of an independent Republic of Belarus, one part of society is so radically separated from the other that if a casual observer were to overhear conversations and read articles by the two groups, it could be concluded that they live in different worlds. Of the parameters that identify a nation, place of residence is the only thing these two groups have in common. They differ by language, their historical memory, identity (despite the fact that both call themselves Belarusians, the meaning is completely different), relations with other nations (dose and distant), their vision of the country ’s future development, etc.

It sometimes seems that these two groups would feel more comfortable in two different countries. The two Belaruses already have two totally separate sets of national symbols. One set comprises the knightly emblem Pahonya (a knight on horseback against a red shield) and the white, red and white flag. The other set comprises’ a traditional Soviet shieldless emblem look-alike framed by a garland and a red and green flag with an ornamental pattern. The Pahonya was inherited by Belarus from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), a state in which the ancestors of most Belarusians dominated during the greater part of their history (in the 13″‘-18″ centuries).

Together with the white, red and white flag, the emblem was adopted as the national emblem of the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR), the first state to appear on these lands after the break up of the Russian empire. These symbols are still used by the BPR government-in-exile that had to leave Belarus in 1920 under the blows of Soviet Russia’s Red Army. These symbols were also the first state symbols of the independent Republic of Belarus between 1991 and 1995.

The alternative set of symbols originates entirely from the period of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), a puppet quasi-state within the USSR founded by the Bolsheviks in one part of the BPR. The BSSR emblem (1927 model) and flag (1951 model) were declared new state Symbols of Belarus in 1995 (after minor modifications) when the neo-Soviet dictator Aliaksandar Lukashenka came to power.

Philosophy Encyclopedic Dictionary (published in Moscow, 1989, p. 581) mentions that the structure of any symbol is “aimed at presenting a total image of the world.” Accordingly, in the Belarusian situation the attitude taken to these symbols is the main indicator of one’s world-view, the main test of whether a person is a citizen of European or Soviet Belarus.

It will be sufficient to quote two comments on the Symbols made by representatives of the two opposed sides in order to illustrate the above. The Statement below was made by the leaders of the so-called “National Assembly,” a representative body of today ’s power, people assigned personally by Lukashenka after the 1996 dismissal of the lawfully elected parliament:

In 1995 and 1996 the people of Belarus specifically and unambiguously expressed themselves on vital issues concerning the further development of our state and society. The old, anti-national symbols were rejected and the “new-old” ones approved. This means that the previous symbols with which a majority of Belarusian citizens associate their lives and the history of the Motherland before and after the war when Belarus was a flourishing republic, one of the 15 fraternal republics within the mighty Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have been accepted. (Zvyazda, September 12, 2000.)

And the judgment of historian Aleh Trusau, Chairman of the Society of Belarusian Language:

The authorities pretty well understand (even now) the artificiality of their symbols. These symbols disappeared from Belarusian postal stamps long ago and were never printed on its banknotes. And this is not incidental. The people have not accepted the symbols forced on them. As early as Independence Day (July 27) 1995, in the town of Lyozna in the Vitsebsk region the legendary Miron raised the white, red and white flag on a 40-meter chimney and left a note saying “Give people back their historical memory.” And it will soon return. The latest 40-thousand-strong Chernobyl Path Demonstration adorned with national symbols is good testimony to that.” (Nasha Niva, May 10, 2000).

In order for a reader, unfamiliar with Belarusian politics, to form an opinion regarding the historical basis for the views on the state Symbols (and therefore world-views), a more detailed presentation of the history of these symbols is given below.

Pre-Soviet Period

According to old Belarusian chronicles, the Pahonya court of arms became a symbol in the 1770s or 1790s when the image of a horseman with a sword above his head “had been established as a symbol representing those who exercised supreme power in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,”, a country that through out its entire history (from the mid-13 “to the late 18 Century) united the lands on which Lithuania and Belarus appeared in the 20th Century.

At various times the ancestors of today’s Belarusians constituted majority of the Duchy ’s population, so it is not surprising that they dominated the culture of this multi-cultural state throughout its history. This is also evidenced by the fact that all state documentation of the GDL used old Belarusian language until the end of the XVII Century when it was replaced by Polish language).

Belarusian cultural domination also influenced the choice of state symbols. A mounted knight was a common subject in the heraldry of Europe at that time and was “an iconographic equivalent to the expression of dux (prince). However, only the Grand Duchy of Lithuania adopted this symbol on the state emblem (in 1566). Exports believe that the symbol originates from local Slavic traditions (that survived in Belarus until the XIX Century) connected with the pagan deity Yaryla “who rides a white horse with a white mantel on his shoulders” ‘and from local iconography of the Christian saints most popular among Belarusians — St. Dzimitry, St. George, St. Barys and St. Hieb, depicted armed and riding a horse. Apart from the state emblem, the Pahonya was also present in the local emblems of most GDL administrative divisions and on the Duchy’s state gonfalon — a red rectangular banner “with the images of Pahonya and Virgin Mary with baby Jesus in a Sun”.

Therefore, for more than 500 years all ethnically Belarusian lands existed “under the sign of Pahonya,” and the ancestors of today ’s Belarusians simply did not know any other state emblem. The Russian empire also saw the Pahonya as a generally recognized and accepted symbol of the lands that were part of the GDL in the latter period of its existence (i.e., contemporary Lithuania and Belarus). Therefore this emblem continued to be used in these lands after their incorporation into Russia in the late 18 Century. Anatol Tsitou, a well-known Belarusian heraldic expert believes the following to be true for that time:

The representation of the ancient Pahonya Belarusian provincial, district, town, and military emblems was a phenomenon that certified the neighboring peoples ‘ realisation of the identity of the two concepts: the geographic and ethnic Belarus and the heraldic Pahonya.”

Under these conditions it looks perfectly natural that activists of the Belarusian national liberation movement, which manifested its full power in early XXth Century, respected the Pahonya as a natural national symbol of their people. In 1916, Maksim Bahdanovich, a classic of Belarusian literature, wrote in his famous poem ‘Pahonya’.

At that time the white knight of the Pahonya adorned the red national flag as well. However, soon after, at the turn of 1916/1917, a new original flag of the Belarusian movement appeared. In full accordance with the wide spread principle of emblem-based flag design in Europe, when the colors of the main details (the emblem and field) are shown in the flag as a combination of horizontal stripes of different or same width, a draft of this white, red and white flag was drawn by Klyawdziy Duzh-Dushewski, a Belarusian architect and politician. In early March 1917 the white, red and white flag appeared in Petersburg on the building of the Belarusian Fellowship of Aid for War Victims, which Duzh-Dushewski worked for.

On March 25, 1918 the Minsk Belarusian National Committee adopted the following resolution:

1. Due to the fact that almost all towns in the Minsk province used the ancient Pahonya in their seals, we resolve to retain this heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Committee has unanimously adopted the Pahonya as the state emblem of the independent Belarus to come.

2. Due to the fact that Belarusian folk art is dominated by white and red Ornaments, it is considered appropriate to use these colours in the Belarusian national flag. Thus the Committee has resolved that the flag is to consist of three horizontal stripes, white, red and white in equal widths, and its length be twice its width.”

The new flag matched the ancient Pahonya so organically that in a short time it became a generally recognised national symbol. In 1917 the “Statute of Belarusian National Cultural Educational Circles in the Army” obliged their members to “wear the Belarusian national sign — a white band with a red stripe in the middle; all three stripes —white, red and white — of the same width.

The following December, white, red and white flags decorated the session hall of the All-Belarusian Congress — the most important national constituent forum in the modern history of Belarus. The 1,872 delegates to the congress, representing all Belarusianorganizations that existed at that time, spoke in favor of the country ’s self-determination as a free state. Thus the question of state symbols of the first modern Belarusian state had been de facto resolved in advance: the state emblem of the Belarusian People’s Republic founded in 1918 was the Pahonya, and the white, red and white flag became the national flag.

It was at this time that first problems related to those symbols arose. The problem consisted in the fact that the process establishing the new country on the Belarusian lands coincided with similar developments undertaken by Lithuanians, the other heirs of the history and traditions of the bygone Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1918, an independent Lithuanian state, first a monarchy and later a republic, was declared covering the former Zhmudksaye (Samahidskaye) region of the GDL (the only large administrative division that had its own emblem, a black bear on a silver field) and adjacent districts of the former Vilna and Troks voivodships (provinces).

In order to emphasize its historical and legal continuity with the GDL (and at that time Lithuanian national leaders attempted to establish control over all the lands once constituting the Grand Duchy), the new independent Lithuania chose the Pahonya as its state emblem.

Moreover, as official ideology declared this newly created Lithuania the only true heir to the former GDL, the descendants of Zhmudzins also usurped the right to use the emblem with an armed horseman on a red background. This caused repeated scandals, such as in December 1919 when a diplomatic delegation of the Belarusian People’s Republic travelling from Berlin to Riga was arrested on the Lithuanian border. The reason for the arrest, according to the minutes of detainment, was the discovery by customs agents of “blank passports of a so-called Belarusian Republic with the Lithuanian emblem on the cover.”

However, the Russian Bolsheviks arriving from the East were even less disposed to the Belarusians using the Pahonya and the white, red and white flag. During the All-Belarusian Congress their representative stated: “We stand for the fraternity of all peoples. There should be no separation into nations.” Pointing at the national Belarusian flag, he said, “Put down this flag.”

Soviet Period

The Bolsheviks established power in Belarus in 1920 and founded “the first state of workers and peasants on Belarusian land.” In 1922, along with other similar “states”, the Bolsheviks incorporated Belarus into a single Communist empire —the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The only flag allowed within its territory was the red flag of the Bolshevik party. The only deviation allowed was an inscription in the upper left corner, in the case of Belarus — “BSSR.” The same applied to the emblem. The first emblem of Soviet Belarus “was a copy of the state emblem of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) with a different inscription.”

Liberalisation implemented by the Communist regime during the period known as the New Economic Policy included the right of the “Soviet republics” to show some degree of national identity. This raised the question of creating new “state” symbols for those administrative divisions of the USSR that were to be “national by form and socialist by content.”

In 1924 the BSSR announced a competition for the best design of such symbols. The Council of People ’s Commissars chose the version of Russian artist Valentin Volkov, who saw no reason to complicate matters and presented a slightly modified copy of Soviet Russia’s emblem: a hammer and sickle, a five-pointed Star, sun and garland. For local colour, the artist rendered the ribbons that wrap the garland in the colours of the national flag of Belarusians – white, red and white.

On 11 April 1927, the “Congress of Soviets of the BSSR approved the “new” emblem after a “minor” adjustment: the ribbons were returned the original colour red. Local “comrades” knew better than the graduate of the Petersburg Art Academy, where the bacillus of “Belarusian bourgeois nationalism” hid. Nothing in the symbols of the “small brother” in the “brotherly family of Soviet peoples,” which was taking Steps toward the construction of a “new national unity — a united Soviet people,” was to remind Belarusians of the times when they were trying to determine the future of their country without the assistance of the “leaders of the world Proletariat.”

The 1927 project (with occasional modifications) became the “state emblem” under which Belarus lived until late 1991. One of the modifications involved the language of the slogan “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” written on the garland ’s ribbon. Initially, the text was written in Belarusian, Yiddish, Russian and Polish. On July 28, 1938, the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR decided to leave only the Belarusian and Russian Slogans. No wonder, as it was at this time that the NKVD was engaged in eliminating “Trotsky ’s agents” and “White-Polish spies” in Belarus. In May 1995 the same “heraldic device” (which actually has little to do with traditional heraldry) appeared on the pediment of the presidential palace to symbolise the aspiration of the new head of state and a large part of the population to shed the burden of independence and return to the “bright Soviet yesterday.”

The red and green flag that currently hangs above the same palace has an even shorter history. In the early 1950s Moscow ordered the administrations of the Soviet republics to complement the Bolshevik red flags featuring a hammer and sickle (that were considered state flags in all the member republics of the Soviet Union) with some standardised details to symbolise the “specificity” of each territory. In order to comply, the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet issued an edict on December 25, 1951 (without any explanation!) that added a green stripe at the bottom of the red flag as well as an Ornament (taken from a hand towel embroidered in 1917 by M. Markevich from the village of Kastsilishcha, Senna district) alongside the staff. This flag was designed (дs was the BSSR emblem) by a Russian artist, this time Nikolay Gusev.

The Pahonya and the white, red and white flag remained the official symbols of the Belarusian People’s Republic and its government-in-exile around which the Belarusian political emigration was grouped, and therefore were automatically forbidden in the BSSR. Prior to 1990, these symbols could be used relatively freely in Belarus only between 1941 and 1944 when the Soviet occupation was replaced by the Nazi occupation. In an effort to gain some degree of loyalty from the local population, the Germans did not forbid Belarusians to use their national symbols. Naturally, under those conditions they were also used by some collaborationist organisations (the Belarusian Council of Trust, the Belarusian Central Council, the Union of Belarusian Youth, etc.). As is known, the Nazis did not gain much from this act of “generosity,” but it later gave the Soviets grounds for political speculation concerning the symbols.

During the entire 70-year history of the Communist regime, these symbols remained the chief Symbols for all people in Belarus in favour of restoring the country’s independence. In the 1940s and 1950s, they were the symbols of the anti-Soviet partisan movement and Underground (the Belarusian Liberation Army, the Belarusian Independence Party, the Union of Belarusian Patriots, etc).

In the 1960s and 1970s, their legal revival in Belarus was the dream of the humanitarian intellectuals of the Academic Centre (liquidated by the KGB in 1974-1975) and the dissident artists of the creative circle “Na Paddashku” (In the Attic)who distributed samizdat postcards and posters featuring the Pahonya. One of the postcards by Yauhen Kulik found its way abroad, was reprinted and evoked a great deal of interest. Therefore, those modest works added the flavour of political liberation to this historical and cultural symbol, and showed the world that the Moscow-directed processes of national degradation and assimilation of the Belarusian people was not yet complete. In the 1980s, the Pahonya and the white, red and white flag becamethewell-known symbols of Belarus and independence, while their public demonstration was unambiguously interpreted by the authorities and their opponents as an act of national resistance.

An example of this is an event that occurred in the autumn of 1985 when Mikhal Miroshnikaw and Yury Makeyew, students of the Hlebau Art School in Minsk, tore the USSR flags off the school building and hoisted the white, red and white flag. As a result, the KGB started legal proceedings against six people; Makeyew was forced to leave school.

Post-Soviet Period

As the process of democratisation unfolded in the Soviet Union, the use of pre-Soviet symbols became wide-spread and demands for their legalisation were voiced (for the first time by the independence-oriented youth Organisation “Talaka” in August 1988). It was under the white, red and white flag that the first Opposition political meeting authorised by the BSSR authorities was held at the Dynamo Stadium in Minsk on February-19, 1989.

However, at that time people were often arrested and persecuted for using this flag and the Pahonya, particularly in the provinces. Even on June 19, 1991 when the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF, the largest Opposition Organisation at that time) was officially registered (two years after it was founded), the registration was granted on the condition that, within three months, the Organisation bring its Statutes into line with legislation, specifically by removing the Provision stating that “the BPF uses the Belarusian historic symbols — the white, red and white flag and the Pahonya emblem.” This condition was imposed despite the fact that the flag had been legalised a year earlier in the capital of the BSSR. In 1990, the Minsk City Council adopted a resolution that allowed using the white, red and white flag дs a national (not state) symbol of the Belarusians (not Belarus).

BPF never had to adjust its Statutes to BSSR legislation. On September 19, 1991, exactly three months after its registration, the country was renamed the Republic of Belarus and adopted the Pahonya and the white, red and white flag. As a result of the continuing collapse of the Soviet empire and the failure of the coup attempt in Moscow earlier in August, the ruling elite in Belarus was ready to do anything to retain power in the country. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Belarusian local branch were banned on August 25, 1991, and those in power found the communist symbols of little practical use.

There were no other historic symbols of Belarus apart from those used mounted by the opposition and there was no time to invent new ones. The Opposition, through its minority in the Parliament submitted proposals for the de-Sovietisation and de-communisation of the country, among which the demand to change the symbols appeared the least threatening to the pragmatic nomenclature. However, for the advocates of Belarusian independence, which represented a minority in the parliament, returning the national Symbols to the Status of state symbols was a matter of principle. Settling this matter was seen as a guarantee of the irreversibility of Belarus’ independence and the Belarusification of its society.

Thus at the end of 1991 an independent Belarusian state was revived with its main emblems corresponding to those of the former states formed on this territory, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Belarusian People’s Republic. However, a large part of the new country’s population was not particularly keen in the area of history (the “pre-Soviet” history of Belarus was hardly mentioned if at all in schools and universities of the BSSR) and those unfamiliar with the subtleties of political manifests, those symbols appeared to be the “private” symbols of the Opposition, who took advantage of the situation to “foist” them on the entire country.

Moreover the former rulers of the BSSR, who usurped power over the Republic of Belarus, proved absolutely unable to manage the economy under the new conditions The first two years after the declaration of independence was the worst period of the economic crisis that began in the late 1980s in the former USSR. Instead of undertaking the necessary reform, the country’s leaders preferred to present the problems flooding Belarus as the inevitable price of state independence so desired by the” nationalist Opposition.” It is therefore little surprise that under those circumstances the words “crisis” “deterioration of living conditions; “independence”, “Pahonya ” “white, red and white flag” and “opposition” merged in the minds of-ordinary people” into one synonymous series.

Meanwhile pro-Soviet and pro-Russian forces, primarily grouped as so-called “siloviki” (such as the never-reformed KGB) and who enjoyed strong support from outside, did not abandon hope to change the trajectory of history and involved themselves in incessant, secret and open, work among the population.” This “work” was most gratefully accepted by the older generation, Soviet veterans of World War II and pensioners, for whom the USSR was the country of their youth and the unexpected changes brought only poverty and want. It is worth noting that at that time those people made up almost one third of the working population.

Neo-Soviet Period

All of these factors were the main reason for the victory of Aliaksandar Lukashenka in the first free presidential elections in 1994. An advocate of restoring the USSR and returning to a Socialist economic system, the young former collective farm manager backed by Russia was bound to win. The following was one of Lukashenka ’s pre-election promises:

l will return our native Belarusian flag [i.e. Soviet] and symbols. The people themselves will decide via a referendum! Let them choose from several versions. Not the one we want to trust in their teeth but the one that raises their spirit.

The promised referendum was held on May 14, 1995 and became the culmination point of the slide-back: Belarus was reverting to the pre-independence situation in terms of politics, civil rights and economics. The restoration of the BSSR-like emblem and flag was, for the Initiators of these retrogressive processes, a necessary “last stroke” to complete the picture of the country’s return to the blessed “Soviet yesterday” The voting was preceded by an insane campaign in the state-run media (including the national television channel, the only one that covers the entire country) against the Pahonya and the white red and white flag, the country’s main symbols of state at that time!

It was heavily stressed that those symbols were used by some collaborators during the World War II Lithuania and its claim to the entire historic heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was thrown in as well Lukashenka stated: “Brazauskas [then president of Lithuania - I.L] said to me: why did you, Aliaksandar Hryhoryevich, take my emblem? I answered: l didn’t, l don’t need it!”

Russian “psychics pondered over the “alien ethnic bio energy in the Pahonya and white, red and white flag.” However, the main point hammered into the heads of readers and viewers was the following: the difficult present is symbolised by the signs of independent Belarus and the “damned nationalists and democrats,” whereas the better future (equal to the bright past) is represented by the BSSR emblems; to return to the communist symbols is a return to youth for the elderly or adolescence-childhood for the middle-aged. Have you never wanted to return to childhood?!

The trick worked! In May 1995, society in the Republic of Belarus split almost exactly in half. The about face to the old Soviet symbols was supported by 40 7% of the voters while 59.3% voted against or ignored the referendum altogether. ” Moreover, the press pointed out that some of those who answered in the affirmative to the question worded by Lukashenka ’s lawyers “Do you support the introduction of the new state symbols?” did not at all mean to vote in favour of emblematic re-sovietisation. This is illustrated in the letter below written by L. Dambrowskaya to the newspaper Nasha Niva :

Dear beloved newspaper! At the referendum I voted for the new state symbols-the white, red, and white flag and the emblem Pahonya. Suddenly it turned out that the “new flag” meant the old red and green For my 37-years of life the red and green flag is the old symbol. l am sure that this is true for many, many people. Has it been so long since we discussed and adopted,the symbols of our newly born state the historic banner and emblem? Whose fault is it then that political thought jumps around like punch, bows now to one side and then to another, now to this and then to another audience? l think that many people did not question the decision already made about the new symbols of the new state, because new state Symbols are not like new brands of sausage or vodka and there can not be several in the memory of one generation.

However, the referendum at least formally had achieved authorities’ aim. Lukashenka’s proposal was supported by a majority of voters in the referendum. Despite the fact that legislative provisions specifically stated that issues of this importance could only be resolved with the participation of the majority of all registered voters, the presidential regime immediately announced its victory. Not waiting until a formal announcement of the voting results, Ivan Tsitsyankow, head of the Presidential Administration and former communist district leader, took the hated symbol of Belarus’ independence off the main flagpole of the country (on the roof of the presidential palace) and publicly tore the white, red and white flag into shreds. That symbolic act of savageness opened an epoch of Schizophrenia existence of the still-independent Republic of Belarus under the “new-old” state symbols of the sub-Soviet BSSR.

Seven months after the Soviet-style symbols were adopted, the absurdity of the situation was made yet more outrageous when the head of the presidential administration announced a “contest for the best explanatory text for the State symbol and State flag of the Republic of Belarus.” However, explaining the signs that according to Vyacheslaw Nasivich, head of the State heraldic service, “are usually interpreted as slightly modified symbols of the Soviet period which illustrates the nostalgia of a large part of population for those times,” proved a very difficult task. This is surprising, considering the extraordinary intellectual potential of the advocates of the “bright yesterday.”

Arkadz Zhurawski, a notorious advocate of linguistic russification, provided an eloquent summary of the contest:

As a whole, the versions sent in for the contest leave a sad impression. They show that the leading Belarusian writers, artists and publicists evaded the contest, and it is not by Chance in the present political and ideological climate of Belarus…

“Some of the versions are verses whose authors use a passionate and emotional form to express their positive attitude to the present symbols. However, one has to admit that these versified works do not meet the main requirement of the competition which was to give the broadest context to the sense and meaning of the present state symbols as a whole or their particular elements…

The prosaic descriptions of the emblem and flag [sic!] submitted for the contest largely vary in both length and content… however, all of them are too short, on average one type-written page. Their general drawback is a complete lack of historic data.”

The contest that started with a bang ended with a whimper. The “first two prizes — 50 minimum salaries each” never found their owners, and the presidential promise to “publish the original text by the contest winner as a decorative brochure” still hangs in the air. The Belarusian intellectual elite demonstrated its attitude towards the policy of reviving the ghosts of the recent Soviet past.

Thus, by the end of 2000 the Republic of Belarus saw the coexistence of two symbolic systems that have the value of state symbols for two main groups in society.

Red flag with green stripe thus reflects the world-view of that part of the Belarusian population whose flag is now hanging above the country ’s administrative buildings: history beginning in 1917, the “golden age” in the Soviet past, the national symbols of the Belarusian as “signs of decline,” etc. Meanwhile, the effort to meticulously regulate all expressions of social life, characteristic for Lukashenka ’s regime, resulted in the use of the symbols being largely reduced. For example, it is illegal to use them in the emblems of non-governmental organisations and the manufacture of state emblems is subject to licensing — at a costly rate.

The above mentioned presidential resolutions even introduce a list of officials who have the right to display the symbols in their offices. As a consequence, these symbols are used “informally” (that is, voluntarily and outside the office) only during events held by Soviet veterans of Worid War II or Communists. Even at such events, one is more likely to see the flag of the USSR and the original BSSR flag than the Lukashenka-modified replicas.

The picture “is completely different with the present use of Belarus ‘ pre-Soviet state Symbols. They are used in whole or in part in the emblems of a large number of Belarusian political parties (from the conservative Belarusian Popular Front to social democrats) and various non-governmental organisations (from “Batskaushchyna” — Fatherland, the international Association of Belarusian diaspora, to the regional Centre of Civil Initiatives in Maladzechna).

The police arrests and beats up people who use the disgraced symbols (the independent Belarusian press has been full of such incidents over the past five years) or, for example, ban the activity of the “Khata” (House) Publishing House for “printing the book “Pahonya” in Your Heart and Mine the contents of which is at odds with the results of the referendum on state symbols and thus negatively influences understanding, unity and stability in society.” However, all this only increases the attraction to these symbols in the eyes of the people who are displeased with the restoration of neo-Soviet order in Belarus.

Therefore, it can be said that the issue of state symbolism in the Republic of Belarus today originates from the uncertainty regarding the country’s further political and civil development. The restoration of the Pahonya and the corresponding flag as the official symbols of an independent Belarusian state depends whether an European Belarus triumphs over a Soviet Belarus.

First published in the book “Belarus – the third sector people, culture, language”, East European Democratic Centre. Warsaw-Minsk, 2002

About the author: Ihar Lalkou, born 1971. Historian and archivist, graduated from the Belarusian State University and the Panthuon-Sorbonne in Paris. Member of the International Society of Belarusthenists and the Belarusian Historical Society. Professionally connected with archiving, worked as a member of the State General Commission of Heraldry of Republic of Belarus, currently works as a scientific secretary of the Belarusian Scientific-Research Centre for Electronic Documentation. Author of books devoted to history of The Duchy of Lithuania.

Prepared by Y.K.

Joseph Stalin

Among the officers of the Polish army killed in Katyn there were many people from West Belarus that was part of the Second Polish Republic before 1939. In particular, one of two generals killed by the Soviets was Bronisław Bohatyrewicz from Hrodna, who had also been a commander of Belarusian national self-defence units in 1918-1919. According to historians’ estimates, about a quarter of the 14.5 thousands people killed in Katyn were Belarusians.

A delegation of Belarusian NGO activists and opposition politicians has visited Katyn in August 2009 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi alliance that has preceded the joint invasion to Poland.

The current Belarusian officials, however, ignore the Katyn massacre. The state ideology rather sympathizes with the Soviets. September 17, the day of the Soviet invasion to West Belarus, is still officially called the Day of Reunification of Belarus. Several years ago the city authorities of Minsk have constructed a road through Kurapaty, an execution site similar to Katyn, ignoring all protests. Unfortunately, there is no place for the history of West Belarus in the current state ideology of the Belarusian government. Belarus is viewed as the descendant of only the BSSR and not as well of West Belarus (and thereby partly of mid-war Poland).

All issues around Katyn and the Soviet invasion to Poland in 1939 are therefore viewed as a matter of Polish-Russian relations, ignoring the geographically obvious fact that Belarus, the land between Poland and Russia, has been in the very centre of the events of 1939 and 1940 as well. There is no sign of Belarusian officials planning to participate in Katyn commemoration ceremony planned for April 2010. It seems like organizers of the event don’t even think of inviting high-ranked Belarusian officials.

Read a story by thenews.pl and a petition by the Russian human rights organization Memorial to president Dmitry Medvedev to open archives and to officially rehabilitate the victims of Katyn.

AČ

The city council has passed a resolution which appeals to the European Parliament to take all possible effective action against the Belarusian state to protect the rights of persecuted Poles in Belarus.

The conflict around the Union of Poles of Belarus is quite far from what it may look like at the first glance. The specific is that the conflict has no nationalistic background at all.

In principle, one can find potential grounds for Polish-Belarusian nationalistic tensions on historical and geographic issues, just as there are tensions between Poland and the Republic of Lithuania around the Vilnius region or between Poland and Ukraine on the role of Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the 2nd World War.

Polonization and repressions against Belarusian national movement in Poland-occupied West Belarus in 1919-1939, transfer of the city of Bielastok (Polish Białystok) and surroundings from Belarus to Poland by Joseph Stalin in 1945 or the fact itself that Poles are the only ethnic minority in Belarus that was largely formed not as a result of migration of people from mainland Poland but from Roman Catholics of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania adopting Polish self-identification – all these controversial historical episodes could have been used by a nationalistic Belarusian government as a reason for tensions with Poland. As a tradition from Soviet times, September 17, the day of the Soviet invasion to Poland in 1939, is still commemorated as the Day of Reunification of West Belarus with the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, but nothing more than that.

Belarus has avoided a wave of nationalistic self-esteem buildup all other newly independent states, like Ukraine or the Baltic states, have been through. The regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka is far from being nationalistic. To the contrary, it seems more cautious about the Belarusian-speaking minority, that is mostly represented by urban intelligentsia and youth in opposition to Lukashenka, than about the Polish minority. There is an official Union of Poles of Belarus led by Stanislau Siamashka that is loyal to the government and that gets support from it.

The prosecution of the unofficial Union of Poles of Belarus led by Anžalika Borys is first of all a prosecution of an organization that is independent from the government and refused to demonstrate loyalty. It should be viewed together with the government’s reluctance to register political parties (like the Belarusian Christian Democracy) or repressions against free press in Belarus – and not along with nationalistic tensions between certain parties in Poland and Ukraine or the Republic of Lithuania.

Read stories by Belorusskie Novosti, Gazeta.pl (in Polish) and TVP (in Polish). See also a background story by Deutsche Welle Russian edition

AČ

“Despite opposition movements, Russian punishments, EU and U.S. sanctions, and color revolutions around him, he remains comfortably ensconced at his palace while European commissioners, patriarchs, popes, and other presidents have come and gone,” says Demeš.

The author reveals the secrets of Lukashenka’s self-made practices in international relations through prism of recent crackdown on Belarus’ Polish minority and upcoming presidential elections.

Belarus’ Aleksander Lukashenko, European Chess-master
GMF Blog
Posted on March 4, 2010

BRATISLAVA, Slovakia — When Aleksander Lukashenko, the authoritarian president of Belarus, began a recent campaign to intimidate and punish members of the country’s disobedient Polish community, he opened a new front not only with neighboring Poland, but also with the EU as a whole that must now meet that challenge head on.

Lukashenko knows how to play and is an effective self-made practitioner in international relations. Having ruled with an iron fist over his country of 10 million since 1994, he is one of the longest-serving presidents in Europe and knows very well how to use internal and external conflicts to maintain his rule. As Lukashenko sees it, Belarusians love and need him as the guarantor of nationhood and stability. Despite opposition movements, Russian punishments, EU and U.S. sanctions, and color revolutions around him, he remains comfortably ensconced at his palace while European commissioners, patriarchs, popes, and other presidents have come and gone.

But early 2011 will see a presidential election in Belarus and, in some ways, the campaign has already begun. Of course, it will be a campaign that is specific to Belarus and a select group of other countries of the former Soviet Union, where leaders are hesitant to retire anytime before they die. This type of election campaign is hardly recognizable to voters or politicians in democratic countries where ballots are actually counted.

The chessmaster Lukashenko understands that he is living in an interdependent and multi-polar world hit by an economic crisis, and he will use the time before next year’s election to test new means of maintaining power that would allow his five-year-old son Kolya (who accompanies him regularly on his domestic and foreign trips) to continue learning from his powerful father until the time that he will be old enough to lead.

Indeed, the 55-year-old Belarusian president, while shaping his peculiar autocratic regime, has learned a great deal about different mechanisms for controlling his own people and limiting the capacity of the outside world to influence his power games. The recent attacks by the police on the Union of Poles, a group representing the Polish minority (there are about 400,000 Poles living in Belarus, some loyal to the regime, others not) and their ramifications seem to be part of Lukashenko’s skilful pre-election political engineering.

The timing of his Polish crackdown coincides with the pre-presidential elections in Poland and allows him to simultaneously demonstrate his overwhelming power both at home and abroad. Paradoxically, neighboring Poland earlier played a key role in the EU’s recent welcoming overtures toward a Belarus that it argued was undertaking political reforms seriously. But the recent persecution of Belarus’ Polish minority outraged Polish public opinion; now Poland is engaged in a bitter bilateral diplomatic war and is talking about new sanctions, conditionality, and visa bans. Polish President Lech Kaczynski and two potential presidential candidates — Bronislaw Komorowski, marshal of the Polish Sejm, and Radosław Sikorski, the foreign minister, are all scrambling to find solutions.

They have rightly called upon the institutions of the European Union for help. The EU, which is still working to define individual roles in the post-Lisbon period, reacted quickly. Jerzy Buzek, the new president of the European Parliament, who coincidentally happens to be from Poland, did his European best to answer Lukashenko’s challenge by calling for a wider approach that doesn’t look only at the issue of the Polish minority. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s new high representative for foreign and security policy, said that Belarusian actions “undermined our efforts to strengthen relations between the European Union and Belarus.”

Lukashenko is at his chess game again — and winning. Top Western officials are writing him letters, negotiating, and asking him politely to do the things they would like him to do. Fact-finding missions are coming to Belarus to discover what they knew before. While Poland and the EU take the time to consider their next step, Lukashenko is already way ahead of them. Indeed, his plans likely include making a grand display of stopping the attacks and beginning a reconciliation process between Belarusians and Poles. But before he does that, he’ll ask for further international financial assistance and other benefits from the very people and institutions who are now asking him to stop persecuting his country’s minorities. And when that assistance arrives, he will use it to extend his control over domestic resistance and opposition before the new round of elections early next year.

Lukashenko is a tough chess player who frequently uses forbidden moves (including removing pieces from the board) that throw his domestic and international opponents off-balance. The new EU leaders should recognize that their peculiar neighbor will not respond to standard diplomatic warnings and pressure, does not care about EU membership, and is capable of creating the illusion of success for those who enter into negotiations with him. They must appreciate that he is fully aware of the West’s political and economic weaknesses and the increasingly process-driven mentality when it comes to democracy assistance and the protection of human rights. In short, the policy of engagement that replaced the strict isolation of Lukashenko’s regime needs to be rethought and recalibrated.

Instead of watching Lukashenko choose the strategy and create illusions, the attacks on the Polish minority in Belarus and Poland’s consequent seeking of European solidarity should help us to rethink our values, commitments, and actions in respect to human rights and democracy, and to come up with real and effective cooperation strategies in this field. If we succeed in European Belarus, we will do much better in other parts of world.

Pavol Demeš is the director of the Central and Eastern Europe program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

VB

]]> http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/05/playing-chess-with-belarus%e2%80%99-dictator/feed/ 0 http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/04/avigdor-lieberman%e2%80%99s-murky-dealings-in-belarus-unveiled/ http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/04/avigdor-lieberman%e2%80%99s-murky-dealings-in-belarus-unveiled/#comments Thu, 04 Mar 2010 10:17:07 +0000 YK http://belarusdigest.com/?p=2585

Avigdor Liberman and Alexander Lukashenka

A loud scandal involving the foreign Minister of Israel and money laundering via Belarusian banks is unfolding. Ze’ev Ben-Aryeh, the former Ambassador of Israel to Belarus, provided Avigdor Lieberman, the Foreign Minister of Israel, classified information when they met in Belarus in 2008.

That information suggested that Lieberman had accepted bribes and evaded taxes using Belarusian banks. Israeli authorities were hoping to cooperate secretly with the Belarusian authorities, but their ambassador kept a copy of the confidential files for himself, and later shared it with his boss Liberman.

The Jerusalem Post reports:

According to the statement released by police, Israel’s former ambassador to Belarus, Ze’ev Ben-Aryeh, allegedly showed Lieberman classified information regarding his investigation by police on allegations that he had accepted bribes and failed to report income to the tax authorities.

The documents had been sent to Ben-Aryeh by the Foreign Ministry to hand over to the Belarus government, whose help Israel required in tracing money transfers from a local bank.

According to the police statement, “the ambassador, who was supposed to pass the request on discretely and directly to the authorities in Belarus, kept one copy for himself. When Lieberman arrived in Belarus on a visit (during October 2008), [Ben-Aryeh] copied classified information from the request, [and] handed it over to Lieberman illegally when they met. The investigation also deals with Lieberman’s involvement in the advancement and job appointments of Ben-Aryeh in the Foreign Ministry in recent months.”

It is interesting that a few years ago the Israeli Embassy in Belarus was closed down completely, but later re-opened. According to Israeli Haaretz newspaper, Avigdor Lieberman became excessively interested in relations between Israel and Belarus long before he was appointed Foreign Minister. As a minister in Ariel Sharon’s government, Lieberman actively lobbied for Israel to reopen its Minsk embassy, closed following budget cuts in 2003.

Although this scandal is an internal matter of Israel, Belarus is becoming internationally infamous for its dealings with all kinds of murky “investors”. The countries of origin vary from Syria and other Arab countries, Russia, Israel, Iraq, Libya and North Kora. It is often unclear what Belarus has to offer to such investors.

Take an example of Emanuel Zeltser, a US lawyer involved in battle over the legacy of a Georgian-Russian businessman Badri Patarkatsishvili who died in London under mysterious circumstances in 2008. Zeltser spent more than a year in Belarusian KGB prison under bogus charges. It is still a mistery what the whole dispute has to do with Belarus.

Despite its ever changing pro-Russian or pro-Western rhetoric, the only aspiration of the Belarus regime is to remain in power for as long as possible. “Money does not smell” seems to be the prevailing ideology in Belarus today.

Read more about Liberman’s story in Jerusalem Post.

YK

]]> http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/04/avigdor-lieberman%e2%80%99s-murky-dealings-in-belarus-unveiled/feed/ 0 http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/02/where-the-west-and-russia-clash/ http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/02/where-the-west-and-russia-clash/#comments Tue, 02 Mar 2010 06:08:23 +0000 V http://belarusdigest.com/?p=2552

]]> http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/02/where-the-west-and-russia-clash/feed/ 0 http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/01/opposition-may-be-the-only-party-to-represent-belarus-in-euronest/ http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/01/opposition-may-be-the-only-party-to-represent-belarus-in-euronest/#comments Mon, 01 Mar 2010 11:58:54 +0000 czalex http://belarusdigest.com/?p=2542 An attempt to influence the Belarusian regime through the Eastern Partnership has failed. At least so far, at least the first attempt of it. Russian newspaper Kommersant reports that the negotiations between a delegation of the European Parliament and the Belarusian officials on Belarus’ participation in the parliamentary assembly of EU and its Eastern neighbours (EURONEST PA) were unproductive.

It is now likely that the Belarusian delegation will be formed from the opposition parties and NGOs, Kommersant quoted MEP Justas Paleckis.

This means that once again the democratic opposition is likely to represent the country at an international forum. It would be virtually the same as if on such forum during the Cold War the USSR would be represented by the Soviet dissidents. The dissidents were brave and dignified individuals but they were neither politically influential nor representative of the whole country.

Belarus has been under authoritarian rule over 15 years. All these years the opposition has practically been deprived of any opportunities to influence on the government’s policies let alone representation in the parliament. The opposition has now practically transformed into a semi-dissident movement. It is able to give a picture of what is going on in Belarus and give advise to the EU in what policy to pursue with Belarus – but these consultations and even some financial and organizational support to Belarusian NGOs can hardly be considered a realistic policy.

It seems that in order to facilitate real change in the country one has to cooperate with the Belarusian authorities and try to influence them. To be exact, one must communicate with president Lukašenka, who is the primary decision maker in the country. As cynical as it sounds – a form of cooperation with the Belarusian government must be developed where officials would be present regardless of the democratic progress in the country. EURONEST PA should become such place.

The officials have refused to form the Belarusian delegation together with the opposition, on a 50/50 representation basis. It is a question whether the European Parliament should have followed the Belarusian officials’ demands and let them have more than just 5 seats in the Belarusian delegation.

Maybe it did not play a significant role at all, as it seems that the political liberalization in Belarus is over anyway, at least till after the presidential elections of 2011, as a political expert quoted by Kommersant said. This sounds very realistic indeed.

Read stories by Kommersant (in Russian), Lenta.ru (in Russian), Deutsche Welle Russian edition; Belorusy i rynok (in Russian), Belorusskie novosti.

AČ

]]> http://belarusdigest.com/2010/03/01/opposition-may-be-the-only-party-to-represent-belarus-in-euronest/feed/ 0 http://belarusdigest.com/2010/02/27/belarusian-potash-and-democracy/ http://belarusdigest.com/2010/02/27/belarusian-potash-and-democracy/#comments Sat, 27 Feb 2010 11:37:40 +0000 YK http://belarusdigest.com/?p=2513 Stay off the potash is the title of Edward Lucas’s recent article in the Economist, where he reflects on effectiveness of trade boycotts. Although the piece is on trade boycotts, the same logic applies to economic sanctions in general. As to Belarus, the point is well-taken – the more Europe isolates Belarus, the stronger will be its dependence on undemocratic regimes such as Russia or China:

Penalising weak-kneed European countries is hard enough. It is even more difficult when trying to put pressure on the source of the problem. If you want to boycott Belarussian goods, say, because of that government’s persecution of its Polish minority, you are unlikely to change your lifestyle much, unless you use industrial quantities of potash or need a lot of cheap tractors.

For countries like Belarus, a trade boycott is outright counterproductive. The more Belarus trades with the rich industrialised world, the weaker will become the ties binding it to Russia. It may be reasonable to try to take custom away from companies that owe their existence to commercial ties with sleazy politicians. But such bodies tend not to sell anything that a normal consumer in the outside world is likely to buy directly. You may not like the fact that some pennies from your fuel bills eventually trickle into the coffers of Kremlin cronies, but there is not much you can do about it.

Indeed, there were good reasons for the European Union to introduce economic sanctions, but their effectiveness remains questionable. Belarus has not become more democratic, despite some promising rhetoric of its government and strained relations with Russia.

This suggests that different approaches are needed. Spreading uncensored information in Belarus and supporting Western-educated Belarusians to return home are likely to be the most effective.

The first method is easy, but has yet been taken seriously only by Poland. Democratic transformation in Belarus depends on public opinion, which is formed almost exclusively by television. Although internet and printed press are important, their role is marginal because only a small fraction of Belarus population uses internet or newspapers to for political information.

Other than treatment of Union of Poles of Belarus, Belsat is the most important single reason for Belarus authorities strained relations with Poland. It is the only independent Belarusian television channel headquartered, which is headquartered and primarily funded by this country. The increased FM radio and television broadcasting from the neighboring countries is likely to break the information blockade of Belarus population. Once the majority of population gains relatively easy access to uncensored information, the political landscape of Belarus will change dramatically.

The other approach requires more creativity. The European Union, United States and other countries spend significant amounts to educate and expose Belarusian youth to democratic values abroad. The theory is that once exposed, they will go back to Belarus and do good there. But in reality, foreign-educated youth cannot find its place in today’s Belarus. Few employers in Belarus state-dominated economy value foreign language skills or western know-hows. The real unemployment is high and the salaries are ridiculously low. As a result, those Western-educated Belarusians who did not stay in the West, find themselves working in Moscow.

Instead of promoting export of Belarusian youth to the West and Russia, Belarus supporters should think of helping them return home. Surviving in Belarus for a year or two would cost a small fraction of the monies spent on education abroad. There is little doubt that supporting research, pro-bono work or teaching fellow Belarusians will be more effective than imposing boycotts or trade sanctions upon them.

Read “Stay off the potash” at Economist.com.
Read “The Achilles’ Heel of Autocracies: The Role of Media in Transition to Democracy” in Willamette Law Review.

YK

]]> http://belarusdigest.com/2010/02/27/belarusian-potash-and-democracy/feed/ 0 http://belarusdigest.com/2010/02/26/bbc-interviews-ivonka-survila/ http://belarusdigest.com/2010/02/26/bbc-interviews-ivonka-survila/#comments Fri, 26 Feb 2010 10:04:21 +0000 YK http://belarusdigest.com/?p=2498

BBC features Ivonka Survila, the President of the Council (Rada) of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in a special broadcast on governments in exile.

According to the program author, Clive Anderson, the Rada is the longest-serving government in exile in the world. The Belarusian Democratic Republic’s independence was declared on March 25, 1918 during World War I, when Belarus was occupied by the Germans according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

After the Germans retreated from the territory of Belarus and the Russian Red Army started moving in to establish the Socialist Soviet Republic of Belarus, in December 1918, the Rada (Council) of the Belarusian Democratic Republic moved to Hrodna, which became the centre of a semi-autonomous Belarusian region within the Republic of Lithuania. During the subsequent 1919 Polish invasion, the Rada went into exile and facilitated an anticommunist struggle within the country during the 1920s.

The BBC program examines interesting examples from around the world, which vary from the serious to the apparently ridiculous.

Clive Anderson examines one of the potentially strangest corners of international politics, the lesser-known governments or rulers in exile – a paradoxical area of international relations and surreal part of international law.

In Toronto, for example, a Belarusian government holds court, run by the charismatic Irvonka Survilla. Their version of Belarus only existed for nine months in 1918 before it was assimilated by the Soviet Union. Now that Belarus is independent, is there any reason for their continued existence?

The broadcast is available at BBC Radio 4 until 1 March 2010. To listen, click here.

]]> http://belarusdigest.com/2010/02/26/bbc-interviews-ivonka-survila/feed/ 1