Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act Passes US Congress Committee
The headlines of stories about the US Congress like the one above are among the few opportunities for the words “Belarus” and “democracy” to stand next to each other. Last week, the US House Foreign Affairs Committee approved yet another piece of legislation on Belarus — “The Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011” sponsored by Representative Christopher H. Smith. The bill is now heading to the full House of Representatives for a vote.
This legislation, H.R. 515, supports human rights in Belarus. Importantly, the bill authorized aid for pro-democracy forces and funding for broadcasting to the country. H.R. 515 also calls for blocking assets owned by senior Belarusian officials, and their families, involved in anti-democratic actions. The bill supports targeted sanctions and demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. It also requires the US administration to report to Congress on Belarusian arms sales abroad, censorship or surveillance of the internet, as well as the personal assets and wealth of governmental figures.
Smith, the sponsor of the bill, has championed Belarusian rights also in previous sessions of Congress. A republican senator currently in his 16th term in the U.S. House of Representatives, Smith chairs the Human Rights Subcommittee and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He authored the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 and the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006—passed the House and Senate with overwhelming bipartisan support. In his Apr. 14 opening statement, Smith was unequivocal in his denunciation of the Belarusian regime. He said, “Lukashenka’s dictatorship has the worst democracy and human rights record of any government in Europe.” He stressed that the sanctions were “aimed at the senior leadership” and that the United States stood “with the Belarusian people against their oppressors.”
The headlines of stories about the US Congress like the one above are among the few opportunities for the words “Belarus” and “democracy” to stand next to each other. Last week, the US House Foreign Affairs Committee approved yet another piece of legislation on Belarus — “The Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011” sponsored by Representative Christopher H. Smith. The bill is now heading to the full House of Representatives for a vote.
This legislation, H.R. 515, supports human rights in Belarus. Importantly, the bill authorized aid for pro-democracy forces and funding for broadcasting to the country. H.R. 515 also calls for blocking assets owned by senior Belarusian officials, and their families, involved in anti-democratic actions. The bill supports targeted sanctions and demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. It also requires the US administration to report to Congress on Belarusian arms sales abroad, censorship or surveillance of the internet, as well as the personal assets and wealth of governmental figures.
Smith, the sponsor of the bill, has championed Belarusian rights also in previous sessions of Congress. A republican senator currently in his 16th term in the U.S. House of Representatives, Smith chairs the Human Rights Subcommittee and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He authored the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 and the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006—passed the House and Senate with overwhelming bipartisan support. In his Apr. 14 opening statement, Smith was unequivocal in his denunciation of the Belarusian regime. He said, “Lukashenka’s dictatorship has the worst democracy and human rights record of any government in Europe.” He stressed that the sanctions were “aimed at the senior leadership” and that the United States stood “with the Belarusian people against their oppressors.”
The Democracy Acts condemning Belarus human rights violations have a long history. The first Act was introduced to the U.S. Congress in November 2001 after the controversial presidential elections. The bill legislated the freeze of the Belarusian assets in the United States, prohibited trade with Belarusian government-run businesses, denied Belarusian officials entry in the United States; and proposed a $30 million appropriation to support democratic institutions and organizations in Belarus. The March 2003 version of the legislature increased the amount to $40 million. In contrast, the 2004 Belarus Democracy Act contained no prohibitions of the travel of Belarusian officials or U.S. exports to Belarus. It also omitted reference to Russia’s role in promoting democracy in Belarus. The 2004 act was reauthorized in 2006, 2007 and 2008.
The primary value of the previous US Democracy Acts is in increasing U.S. aid for democratic institutions and civil society initiatives in Belarus. To date, the aid that the US provided through other channels has been modest ($11.5 million in FY2009, and $15 million (allocated) in FY2010). Moreover, its efficiency has suffered from the noncooperation of the Belarusian regime (for example, the U.S. diplomatic staff in Belarus has been reduced to five people after a diplomatic dispute). The Obama administration has requested $14 million in aid in FY2011, but only $9.6 million of this amount is designated for “political competition and consensus-building” and “civil society.”
What impact will the bill have if it passes Congress and becomes law? Smith hopes it will serve as a “signal to Lukashenka” and “propel[s] this policy forward amidst the administration’s competing priorities.” Yet history shows that economic leverage rarely translates into political gains. In fact, if the sanctions do have any effect in Belarus, it may be strengthening the authoritarian regime. After all, it would be naïve to think that the Belarusian officials would be eager to make a trip to the United States or that they would not know better than to keep their assets in the US and EU banks. Back in 2004, President Lukashenka would say he “could not get a better gift.” His reasoning went as follows, “If you scold me for seeking internal and external enemies, why are you giving me a pretext for finding such an enemy outside the country? Why are you supplying me with such a chance?”
The most the sanctions can accomplish is signal the United States’ resolve to exert pressure and its intolerance for human rights violations globally. Unfortunately, they impose little strain or cost on Washington, and therefore lack weight and credibility, which was acknowledged by Lukashenka himself in 2009 when he told the US delegation visiting Minsk, “If you are strong people, you should repeal this law and abrogate these sanctions that are meaningless to the US.”
However, the sanctions do irk the authoritarian leader. For instance, in 2009, Lukashenka said lifting the US sanctions and repealing the Democracy Act were the preconditions for returning the US ambassador to Minsk. Most importantly, the increased aid toward civil society development and the pro-democratic forces in the country will have an immense positive effect in the long run.
VC
Lukashenka in the Russian Hands
The worst nightmare of the Belarusian regime is a serious confrontation with Russia and the West at the same time if both parties agreed to the removal of Lukashenka. Of course, this scenario is hard to imagine but it is equally difficult to imagine such change without coordination between these stakeholders. The internal opposition is nearly crushed in Belarus but public dissatisfaction with Lukashenka’s rule is widespread in Belarusian society as never before.
The game is between Lukashenka, Russia and the West, with organized opposition as a minor player, often used as a whipping boy. The Friday news came as a threat to Minsk that its nightmare can materialize. Russia, together with the IMF, is willing to help Belarus’ struggling Belarus economy, but only if the Belarusian government will continue reforms, said Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin on Friday at the forum on US-Russian relations in Washington.
Kudrin’s statement demonstrated that Lukashenka cannot count on unconditional support from Moscow or, perhaps, anyone at all. Much worse, Moscow recently showed that it agreed with the West even on such international ‘hot cases’ such as Libya. As Russia and China left Qaddafi without their protection, Belarusian state media were outraged that the Chinese and Russians ignored the fate of their long-standing partner. Though there are few reasons to compare Lukashenka’s rule with the rule of Qaddafi, it became clear that Lukashenka could not rely on his foreign allies anymore.At the moment, the Russian government – more firmly than ever – is holding the Belarusian regime in its hands. It deprived Belarus of its long-time lucrative business of reprocessing cheap Russian crude oil for sale of refined oil products in the West. Taking away this source of profit from Lukashenka, Moscow ruined the whole political economy of Belarusian regime. How exactly important it is, is the subject of a recent admission by Belarusian economist Georgi Gryts. According to him, about half of all Belarus’ exports are generated from by just three sources – oil, potash and black metals.
In accordance with the new arrangements on oil, Belarusians no longer be able to ear big money on refining and reselling Russian oil because a significant share of the profits now go straight into Russian pockets. After Russia introduced these arrangements, the question of an economic crisis for Belarusian regime became only a matter of time. The hard currency reserves of Belarusian National Bank diminished month by month.
The panic finally gripped the Belarusian population watching such developments as they continue to expect a new devaluation of the national currency. Losing its economic foundation, the Belarusian government could only turn to Russia for new loans. The West was not an option following post-election accusations against some Western countries through Belarus’ propaganda and the arrogant political line taken by the Foreign Ministry of Belarus supporting Qaddafi. When in mid-March Russian Prime Minister Putin visited Minsk, the most important issue on the table were new loans to Belarus.
It seemed settled that Lukashenka would get ca. USD 13 billion: 6 billion for a nuclear power plant, 2 billion from Anti-crisis Fund of the Eurasian Economic Union (EurAzES), one billion dollars as in credit from the Russian government and USD 4.3 billion in the form of oil subsidies. Yet something went terribly wrong for Minsk and now Lukashenka is being pressured to make reforms and threatened to be deprived of the promised money. The situation could hardly be worse. The brutal crackdown which followed the presidential elections on December 19th and the terrorist attack of April 11th shocked the nation. People are now hunting for dollars and euros and buying up as much food, commodity products and cars as they can, quite reasonably expecting them to get much more expensive.
The measures taken by Belarus’ government so far have proven futile. It is no wonder that the Belarusian leadership once again recently compared Belarus to a besieged fortress penetrated by enemies. Even before the presidential elections we expected them to pressure us, while purposefully and methodically destabilizing the situation. It came true – first on the foreign currency market, then on the food market, and after that an explosion happened in the underground. A long single chain.
Lukashenka continues to denounce those “who do not like our [public] stability and tranquility”. In another statement he instructed investigators to interrogate opposition activists who expressed their views on the terrorist attack. Such conspiracy thinking, however, shows the desperation and inability to seek rational solutions. After all, the current problem that Belarus produces less than it consumes cannot be overcome by a public hate campaign.
The only solution is to carry out serious reforms and modernize the Belarusian economy to make it produce more. Towards that end, foreign currency is indispensable, and given the circumstances of rather an irrational confrontation with the West, large amounts of such money can come only from Russia.
SB
