Russia Saved Lukashenka Yet Again

The weekend brought a pleasant surprise for the Belarusian leadership. It managed to get a big loan from the Eurasian Economic Community – a post-Soviet integration bloc dominated by Russia. This week, Lukashenka will be given 800 million USD, and another 2.2 billion will follow over the next 3 years at a 4.1% interest rate.

 

The most important requirement of the loan is the privatization of state-owned assets in Belarus which are worth 7.5 billion USD.

Of course, there might be many demons lurking in the unpublished details of the deal, but so far this money seems to be more than just help for Lukashenka. It is his rescue.

 

The Belarusian government seemed to be desperate  last week when it initiated contacts with the IMF about borrowing 3.5-8 billion USD. There was not much hope to get it in times like these when relation with the West are at their lowest point, and the previous loan from the IMF did not lead to real economic reforms in Belarus.

 

No 'Kyrgyzstan scenario'

 

The reasons for Russia's rescuing of Lukashenka may be very simple. After all, the Kremlin does not want to repeat in Belarus what unfolded in the Kyrgyzstan scenario with the toppling of the government. The current situation around Belarus, of course, can be compared to that of Kyrgyzstan last year in a very few but important ways.

 

In 2010, Moscow tried to rein in the Kyrgyz president who had at that moment lost any support from the West. Russia's policy was perceived by the opposition as a signal that the president had no backing and that the foreign powers would prefer some other rulers to run the country. Even though it did not want to do it, Moscow carried out regime change in that Central Asian nation, and the results failed to bring Russia any benefits whatsoever.

 

And to risk the same in Belarus is apparently more dangerous, both due to the proximity of the country to Russia itself, and due to the consequences it might have for Russian relations with the West. At the same time, Russia needed some alternatives before removing this president, and quite possibly it did not find one in the Belarusian establishment or in the opposition . Lukashenka has neutralized any such moves by building structural barriers for the development of any new politicians (there is no place for public politics in Belarus now), and by the destruction of the support base and public image of old politicians.

 

Towards Terminal Stability

 

To survive politically, Lukashenka does not need much. Just some flexibility in order to rearrange his power mechanisms – like through giving in to foreign loan requirements and selling some property. Of course, these weeks the public mood has been very much against his policies and only the lack of an opposition which could organize the discontented citizens has saved the Belarusian government from collapse.

 

But public grievances, however big they are, can be neutralized by one very common factor – time. That is, if the Belarusians have to live worse, they will do it, yet the decline of living conditions should occur as slowly as possible. Otherwise, even a politically sterilized society will explode and find itself new political leaders.

 

The country has no means to survive as it had before. In order to avoid collapse or even revolution, it has either to reform or to accept impoverishment. The former option is not feasible with the current political regime. For the latter, the Belarusian leadership has to buy time. It will mean to bring the households' incomes gradually lower, to untie the prices without shock effects, to give some subsidies and reduce them incrementally. In a word, to draw the people into poverty not in a day, but over many months.

 

For all these efforts he needs money. Now, he has it, and given that circumstances are as they are, Belarus may be stabilized politically for a long time.

 

Myth of a European Alternative for Lukashenka

 

Can Europe do anything? The question sounds rhetorical for Belarusians involved in politics. After all, Europe – with the remarkable exception of Poland – did next to nothing tangible, except for making some verbal statements. The best example is the myth of a European proposal of 3 billion for relatively acceptable (for the EU) presidential elections made by the Polish and German foreign ministers last year.

 

The proposal was not really made in any serious way. The myth was born when the Polish minister was asked how much financial support Belarus can get from the EU if it accepts the European demands. He took the figures of the EU financial help for Moldova and recalculated them considering the bigger size of Belarus to finally name this sum.

 

Informally, European officials admit also that this sum, if it even materialized, could not be compared with Russian loans. Moreover, Lukashenka was successful in the past not only in getting money from Russia but also negotiating flexible timetable for repayment or restructuring or even not reapying the loans at all.

 

SB

 

Siarhei Bohdan is an associate analyst at the Ostrogorski Centre.

Subscribe

If you enjoyed this article, subscribe to our bi-monthly newsletter

 

Follow BelarusDigest on social networks

Related stories
Orphus system Found a typo? Select spelling error with your mouse and press Ctrl + Enter