Belarus Needs an Enemy
If one listens to the Belarusian and Russian leadership, a war with the West is imminent. This weekend, the Belarusian internet was filled with stories about Moscow being ready to defend Belarus from Warsaw's claims to the Grodno and Minsk regions in Poland. In November 2011, Head of the Russian General Staff General Nikolai Makarov presented an alarmist map that showed Russia and Belarus surrounded by hostile nations plotting to occupy them.
Since the 1990s the Kremlin has used Belarus as an ally who is ready to spout radical statements about NATO – something Russia, as a more internationally respected state, cannot do to the same extent. In return, Russia arms Belarus with its weapons at a discount. Putin's vision of the Eurasian Union, one step closer after the countries formed a common economic space on January 1 2012, is intended to take military cooperation to a new level.
Although Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s outbursts have increased his country’s isolation, they perform a useful function for Russia by reminding NATO of Russia’s sphere of influence. Belarus also makes Russia's rhetoric look more moderate. Geographic proximity to the West of Russia allows a weak Belarus to keep its neighbors alert and to secure generous subsidies from Moscow. If the external threat is indeed growing, as claimed by the Belarusian Ministry of Defense at a December 27 conference, Belarus’s prominence will increase.
Fighting Enemies as an Image Statement
With Russia equipping and training the Belarusian military, Minsk need not worry about developing a grand strategy and conducting responsible foreign policy. But if Moscow becomes serious about improving ties with the West, Belarus' leader would have to be reined in. Right now, Lukashenka enjoys reminding Russia about Belarus’ role in defending the Union State and Russia. In 2010, he complained about having to buy weapons at market prices and said that for Belarus defending the “brotherly state” was “profitable, even an issue of image”. This is music to the ears of some Russian policymakers paranoid about Ukraine’s flirtations with NATO.
Russia's military doctrine, approved in February 2010, indeed names NATO expansion as the main external threat. Similar to NATO's article 5 it considers "an armed attack on the state-participant in the Union State" to be "an act of aggression against the Union State" (aka Russia). Russia’s commitment does not allay Belarus’ threat perceptions. Even so, in 2009, Belarus' military budget amounted to 4.18% of government expenditure, according to a 2010 World Bank report.
A small country in such a close military alliance with nuclear-armed Russia could economize on defense, but Belarus spent slightly more than Lithuania (3.85%) or Latvia (4%). Of course, this could be because Belarus' military doctrine is based on its own threat list, which includes "interference into internal affairs", "expansion of military blocks and alliances which are detrimental to military security" of Belarus, and even "information (psychological) influence which is directed against the interests of the Republic of Belarus and its allies".
How Belarus Became Russia's Shield
How did the country that once sought neutrality and gave up nuclear weapons become a zealous Cold Warrior? After all, even Kazakhstan, also closely allied with Russia, has been moderate in its rhetoric and became a key NATO ally in the Afghan war. After a brief attempt at diversifying foreign policy by joining NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1995 (after Russia), Minsk pursued full-scale political and military integration with Moscow. The two countries’ air defense forces have served together since 1995. That year, Belarus also extended Russia's right to keep early warning radar and communication bases on its territory – rent-free for 25 years. A common arms procurement program was launched in 2000.
In the 1990s the young Belarusian state had to choose. One way of generating income was by initiating reform and enhancing economic and trade cooperation with Europe. However, the price – democratization and economic reform – seemed too high for the new Belarusian leadership. Another way of generating income was courting Russia. In 1996, Minsk signed a treaty on the Russia-Belarus Community; in 1997 the Community became Union and in 1999, the Union state. Inviting Kazakhstan, introducing a common economic space and adding “Eurasian” this year is simply the next step in strengthening Belarus’ dependence on Russia and foregoing its freedom to conduct independent foreign policy.
But doing business with Russia has had its perks for the regime insiders, insulating them from political competition and allowing the shadow economy to flourish. In the 1990s, Belarus earned huge profits from selling weapons to unsavory regimes, appearing on the list of the world's ten largest arms exporters. Once Belarus disposed of its own rusting Soviet arsenal, it was rumored to have helped sell Moscow’s, providing Russia with political cover for trade with pariah states.
The High Price of Confrontational Policy
Playing up its role as the first line of defense against NATO and exploiting Moscow’s old phobias have been Belarus’ tactics for over a decade. For example, the rent-free use of Belarusian “bases”, criticized by the Belarusian opposition as politically and economically unwise, has paid off for the regime if not also for the population. The military bases were used in several gas wars with Russia. In 2003, Lukashenka even warned about turning off electricity to Russia's Volga radar station. In contrast, after Russia's Central Election Commission approved the outcome of Belarus' 2010 presidential election, Minsk said the rent-free use of the bases would continue.
Over the years Belarus’ has lost its ability to bargain with Russia, however. As was bluntly stated in a US cable from November 2009, published by WikiLeaks, “Belarus is bankrupt, and therefore vulnerable to Russian exploitation”. Everybody knows that despite Belarus’ anti-NATO bluster, it is Russia which calls the shots on both military and economic integration. Alone, Belarus has neither a strong military nor a strong economy. The December 2010 elections contributed to Minsk’s loss of external support in dealings with Moscow and the economic crisis of 2011 delivered another heavy blow with Gazprom buying Beltransgaz.
At this point, the Belarusian leader has squandered his opportunities for dialogue with the West and undermined his own “multi-vectored” foreign policy. Playing Europe against the Kremlin to get economic benefits worked in the past. However, in the end Belarus’ irrational behavior made some European states welcome rather than fear Minsk’s loss of independence to Moscow. Many in the West are no longer concerned to see Russian influence in Belarus grow, preferring to border a more predictable and responsible eastern neighbor. This is good news neither for the Belarusian people not its current leadership.
In its 21st year as a sovereign state, it is high time for Minsk (and indeed Moscow) to develop non-confrontational foreign policy goals. As a small state, Belarus has to adjust to the greater powers around it, and the best solution is to spread the risk among several international actors rather than surrender its sovereignty to one of them. This means balancing ties with both EU and Moscow, diversifying trade and reforming the economy, and avoiding entanglement.
Why Young Belarusians Go to Russia, Not Europe
Alexander Rumak from the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection declared that the Belarusian labour market would not deteriorate this year. According to official figures, the unemployment rate in Belarus is merely 0.6% of the economically active population. The reality, however, is different from the rosy picture the Government of Belarus is trying to paint.
Thousands of young Belarusians migrate to Russia to escape unemployment and low wages. While Russia is waiting for Belarusian migrants who benefit its economy with open hands, the European Union keeps its doors shut, maintaining the highest visa fees in the region for Belarusian citizens. To balance Russia's influence, the European Union should become more open and offer more education and work experience opportunities for the Belarusian youth if it wants to see Belarus democratic and pro-European in the future.
Economic Reasons for Migration
Belarusians paid dearly for Lukashenka's 2010 election campaign. Just before the presidential elections in December 2010, the average wage in Belarus was more than $500. In November 2011 it was just $280, according to official statistics. Outside Minsk the salaries are even lower. In 2011, Belarus suffered the worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The policy of printing money just before the 2010 presidential election resulted in the inflation rate of 108% in 2011 and devaluation of the Belarusian rouble by more than 189%.
Most employees in Belarus receive practically equal salaries no matter how much or where they work because of the Soviet-era wage leveling. Even those who work in the prestigious banking sector, enterprise management or media feel they lack opportunities for professional development and cannot afford a good lifestyle. At the same time, low skill factory and farm workers feel more protected under the current regime. They are the main electorate of Lukashenka and he proclaims “social stability” in favour of them. The lack of career opportunities lead to a brain drain and massive migration of high-skilled workers and talented youth to Russia.
The National Statistical Committee of Belarus keeps insisting that the current unemployment rate in Belarus is just 0,6%. In reality the number is much higher because the Committee only counts the number of people who officially register at employment bureaus. According to some estimates, around 150,000, or 3%, of economically active people leave Belarus annually. This number significantly exceeds the official figures. However, the precise number is impossible to determine because it is difficult to monitor migration flows between Belarus and Russia in the absence of any visas or border control between the two countries.
What do Young Belarusians do in Russia?
Belarusians can work in Russia without visas or additional permissions. They also have the same rights to education as Russian citizens. Their education in Russia is free if they successfully pass entrance exams – where at small regional universities or reputable Moscow State University or the Higher School of Economics. One of the most prestigious Russian universities, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, has become Alma Mater for dozens of Belarusians: 41 of them studied there in 2011.
The majority of graduates of Russian universities do not return to Belarus because of lack of opportunities there. The income difference can be very significant. For example, the entry-level salary in the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is about $100 while in Russia young diplomats start with at least $650. Food, leisure and clothing costs are practically the same in Minsk and in Moscow. Such income disparity naturally motivates Belarusian graduates to stay in Moscow and search for high-paid jobs.
As a result these Belarusians contribute to the prosperity of Russia rather than of Belarus. The effectiveness of any modern economy depends on the level of added value in products and services. It is exactly highly skilled specialists and creative people who increase the added value through innovation. Russia is aware of that and stimulates migration to improve its difficult demographic situation. According to official Russian statistics, in 2009 immigrants almost completely compensated the natural population loss caused by the low birth rate in Russia. Because the Russian language is widely spoken by the urban population of Belarus, they assimilate in Russia much faster than other migrants from the former USSR.
How Can Europe Respond?
The European Union should match Russia's generosity by offering more education opportunities for young Belarusians. Certain steps have already been taken: the Open Europe Scholarship Scheme offered a significant number of scholarships for the education of Belarusians in leading European universities in 2012-2013. However, European policymakers could go further and enable Belarus to join the Bologna process. They should also foster academic exchanges and cooperation such as Erasmus programs to enable the young people of Belarus to live and travel beyond Russia.
The European Union could also increase the number of internships and visiting positions available for Belarusians in European political, economic and education institutions. This would allow more young Belarusian professionals in different fields to develop experience and connections in the European context. At some point, these young people will rule Belarus.
Direct support of Western-educated Belarusians who want to return to Belarus is also very important. It would prevent a brain drain and help them to adapt to Belarus after their studies. Graduates will be more interested in staying in their native country if there are more suitable employment opportunities inside the country at western companies, NGOs and other institutions. Unfortunately, per capita foreign direct investments in Belarus (which borders three EU countries) are almost three times lower than in Russia. Establishing research projects and other initiatives to be implemented in Belarus is also possible despite difficulties which might be created by the Belarusian government and bureaucracy.
To Distinguish Between People and the Regime
Therefore, the European Union should be more interested in creating favourable education and internship conditions for the Belarusian youth if it wants to play an active role in promoting democracy in Belarus. This kind of youth engagement policy also implies development of direct support schemes for European university graduates in Belarus.
The European Union should also increase its presence in Belarus and foster Belarusian-European contacts at all levels. It can be done without compromising on the issue of human rights, which should also remain part of the agenda. Today, increasing contacts with the Belarusian population is the only way to gain at least some political and economic leverage to influence the situation in Belarus. Ordinary Belarusians should not remain hostages of the Belarusian regime’s reckless policies and human rights abuses.