Mortal Combat: Lukashenka v Bureaucracy
Belarus is on the verge of an unprecedented process: a massive layoff of government employees. At least, President Lukashenka has ordered it. According to him, because of the budget constraints the state apparatus will be trimmed by 25-30%. Several weeks ago he established a special state commission to prepare a package of proposals for an overhaul of the existing administrative system.
No doubt, the large public sector in Belarus needs reform. But most likely the commission will only tackle the reductions while it will fail to address the core problem – the overblown functions of the government.
And even to cut the large number of civil servants will become a real challenge for Lukashenka. Previous historical attempts to tame bureaucracy without changing the political system proved fruitless. Moreover, they usually brought about the fall of those rulers who initiated such reforms.
Bureaucrats on the Run
The reason why Alexander Lukashenka has become concerned about the excessive number of employees in the public sector is simple. State bureaucrats have always had modest salaries compared to the private sector. But after last year’s devaluation their earnings dropped by more than 2 times (when calculated in US dollars).
This year the salaries grew but they still appear to be rather small. Low-ranking government officials earn around $250-350 USD a month. Their middle-ranking colleagues get about USD 600-700. Those in managing positions, like the heads of ministry departments, can earn up to $1000 USD. Compared with, for example, Russia, Belarusian civil servants look significantly worse off. The average salary of their Russian counterparts reaches $1800-1900 USD.
And the workload is rather large. In some ministries people have to come to the office even on weekends in order to keep track of enormous amount of paperwork.
Of course, there are not so many enthusiasts among the state officials who want to work for peanuts. Therefore, more and more of them are leaving their government posts for better positions elsewhere. And the influx of newcomers is not enough to replace all of them. As a result, the number of vacancies in state institutions is growing. And those who stay are increasingly less stimulated to perform their duties properly.
This is an unacceptable situation for Alexander Lukashenka. The state bureaucracy serves as one of the major pillars of his unlimited powers. If this drain of professionals continues he will soon have no one to carry out his orders. So now his idea foresees the firing of 25-30% of government employees and use these funds to raise salaries for the remaining officials.
Thus, Lukashenka’s real concern comes not from the excessive size of the public sector as such but rather from the serious difficulties with recruiting people to fill all the government positions. If it were not for the financial difficulties he would be happy to keep the state apparatus as it is.
How Big is the State Machinery?
The Belarusian state controls much of what remained of the Soviet state-run economy. Roughly 80% of all the assets in the country are owned and run by the government. It is no wonder that to manage this amount of state property and assets, the authorities need a sizeable bureaucratic apparatus.
Belarus has 24 ministries. To compare: Russia and Poland have 18 ministries each, Ukraine – 16, Lithuania – 14 and Latvia – 13. Read more
Today, Belarus has 24 ministries. It is the biggest number in the whole region. To compare: Russia and Poland have 18 ministries each, Ukraine – 16, Lithuania – 14 and Latvia – 13. Besides the ministries, the government system includes several state committees and consortiums.
Overall, more than 165,000 people work in the public sector. According to the Belarusian Statistics Agency, roughly 60,000 of them belong to civil servants and the remaining 100,000 or so can be called “men in uniform”.
Who exactly this latter category includes seems impossible to find out. The information is classified. But, clearly, the absolute majority of the “men in uniform” represent the Ministry of the Interior. Hence, the number of policemen in Belarus significantly exceeds the numbers in other European countries of a similar size or population. For example, Sweden has fewer than 20,000 policemen, Austria has 27,000 and Bulgaria’s police force account for 30,000 of the public sector. This is significantly less than the 100,000 Belarus has.
This statistics points to two major problems with the Belarusian system of public administration. The first one is the big number of ministries and other state bodies, which means that the Belarusian government has too many functions to perform. The second has to do with the overblown size of the police. Therefore, any reform of the state apparatus should primarily tackle these two problems.
The special state commission that has to draft a concept for reforming the public sector seems unlikely to solve these two problems. At best, it will only handle the 25-30% reductions among the civil servants and not the excessive state functions.
The individual composition of the commission is evidence of these low expectations. All of its members are experienced state bureaucrats from different government bodies. Some of them are younger and more progressive in their views then the others. For example, the economy minister Mikalai Snapkou and the finance minister Andrey Kharkavets. Perhaps, even Natalia Petkevich, an aide to Lukashenka, who serves as deputy chairperson of the commission.
But none of these people look like real reformers who can think outside of the box and bring in innovative ideas. They all represent the system and will hardly come up with any drastically new proposals. Natalia Petkevich, for example, already announced at a closed meeting of the commission that they would not deal with the police issue – clearly it is too politically sensitive. Meaning that Lukashenka is afraid of any moves that can harm the police apparatus and, therefore, better not to touch the problem at all.
Another reason to be sceptical of this commission is historical. The world has seen many examples of non-democratic regimes trying to tame their overblown bureaucracies. And there are virtually no success stories to be found. Usually rulers, who suddenly turn reformist because of their financial difficulties, lose battles against their endemic bureaucracies. Mikhail Gorbachev and his perestroika can serve as a good example.
Like Gorbachev, Lukashenka can also fall victim of his involuntary reform attempts. Even being a more decisive and brutal politician, he is too dependent on the bureaucratic machine he personally created.
The risks get even higher as Lukashenka loses popular support. And the latest public opinion surveys show that this has been the case for the last several months. His personal approval rating froze at around 30%, even though the government raised the average salary by roughly 15% this year.
When the majority of the population no longer favour the incumbent, the bureaucracy can be the main source of his power. Fighting bureaucracy in this situation can turn out to be politically lethal. But Lukashenka does not really have much choice. The foundations of his legitimacy look shaky and the economic prospects are not very promising.
Time will show who will prevail in this mortal combat between Lukashenka and Belarusian bureaucracy.
Belarus After Elections: Three Years of Stability?
On 23 October the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Anglo-Belarusian Society in London organised an event titled ‘Belarus After Elections: Three Years of Stability?’
The main speakers were Katia Glad from Chatham House and Yauheni Preiherman of the Liberal Club in Minsk who is also a regular contributor to Belarus Digest. Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, moderated the discussion.
The participants focused primarily on the post-election situation of Belarus. They also considered possible scenarios for future developments in the country and the role of the Belarusian opposition. Other topics covered were the current trends in politics and the economy as well as the possible role of the pro-government organisation Belaya Rus which officially won a majority in the recent elections.
‘Stable Instability’ of the Regime?
The participants noted that the opposition is not united and that there is a lack of a strong protest mood, and discussed recent trends in the economy. Other factors were alluded to, such as the high level of repression in Belarus, Moscow’s financial support, as well as the West’s unsuccessful policies which help official Minsk to remain in good shape. It is largely due to these factors that the Belarusian regime appears to many as a solid system with confident authorities.
Thus, the possibility for any major changes within the regime remains rather low, unless a shift within the elites takes place or there is some impulsive action from Moscow. One such scenario could be a sudden drop in oil prices which would make Moscow unable to continue supporting the Belarusian regime. Clearly, Russia remains the most important supporter of Minsk. While it is a member of the Customs Union of Belarus, something which helps to preserve the stability of the Belarusian regime, it is well known that this is an organization that also receives significant financial support from and is directed by Moscow.
On the other hand, Belarusian society is clearly suffering from fatigue. People remained indifferent to the recent parliamentary elections because of widespread knowledge of the Parliament’s puppet role, but also unfairness when it comes to counting of the vote. But as both domestic and international political actors started to put more pressure on Minsk, the regime’s stability can be endangered. Some participants believed that the boycott campaign of the September elections proved that the electorate at large is unhappy about the Belarusian regime.
Economy against the Regime
The recent negative trends in the economy also play against Minsk and put its stability at risk. Russia’s entry into the WTO brought about some negative consequences for Belarus and will make Minsk seek further financial support from Moscow. The consequences include a high level of competitiveness from other countries’ goods and services which can inevitably become a threat to Belarusian companies.
Nonetheless, significant destabilisation of Minsk-Moscow relations seems highly unlikely. Moreover, due to Lukashenka’s aversion to any changes in the system he has built, the scenario of serious modernization also appears unlikely.
The Opposition: a Single Candidate or a Better Strategy?
The participants agreed on the opposition’s weakness and inability to achieve its political goals. One of the speakers suggested that only a strong leader and well-organised structure could help the opposition to effectively communicate with Belarusian society. However, so far the opposition presents rather short-term thinking strategy and thus it cannot achieve its political goals.
A scenario of a single candidate is also difficult to implement because the regime is consolidated and will try to fragment the opposition. Others thought that because the elections are neither free nor transparent, the opposition’s single candidate would not change the final result anyway.
Despite serious internal difficulties within the opposition, the recommendation for it was to work on preparation of the Belarusian people for one credible candidate in the future. The work at grassroots level should also play a significant role.
Moreover, one of the speakers argued that if the opposition won't change its behaviour and work with common people and elites, then it will not be relevant to the transformation process in Belarus. At the same time, the opposition and civil society should focus more on closer co-operation with the EU and reach a wider audience in Belarus.
E-voting for a Single Candidate in Belarus?
The idea of e-voting to select a single opposition candidate in Belarus failed to spark much optimism among the participants at the event. Firstly, that would require significant financial resources to establish such a voting system, which makes it impossible to work over the next couple of years. Moreover, the regime’s repression and control of the electoral process technically disables the possibility for application of e-voting in the near-term future.
The Russian opposition still operates in a much more liberal environment compared to Belarus. They were even able to have voting for their opposition leadership not only on the Internet, but also in a number of places offline. That would be difficult to imagine in Belarus.
The Need for Change
One of the arguments raised was related to the social contract in Belarus. In reality it means guaranteed stability in exchange for society’s passivity.
Because of the economic crisis, the domestic and unprecedented international pressure imposed on Lukashenka, protest moods may yet still grow in Belarus. In addition to traditional pressure, the ruling elites and the Belarusian electorate at large also demonstrate a demand for reforms of the system.
Since all the political actors stress the necessity of macroeconomic changes, these changes would mean a transformation of the system. The current regime remains very reluctant to make any changes. Time will show for how it will be able to oppose changes.
The discussants analysed the phenomenon of Belaya Rus, a pro-government association which officially won the recent Parliamentary elections with 57% of all seats. According to some participants, transformation of Belaya Rus into a new political party could mean the end of the old politics because elites will be able to consolidate and better articulate their agenda.
Others were sceptical and thought that Belaya Rus was just window dressing and will be not more important in the current parliament. Whatever role Belaya Rus will have, it is unlikely to contribute to the end of “stable instability” in Belarus.