Lukashenka appoints a top communist as the new Minister of Education
On 15 December President Aliaksandr Lukashenka appointed vice-mayor of Minsk Ihar Karpenka as Minister of Education. However, two important facts about the latter have caused serious discussion within the Belarusian expert community.
First, at the moment of his appointment, Ihar Karpenka was the Head of the Communist Party in Belarus. Second, the dismissal of the previous Minister, Dr. Mikhail Zhuraukou, contained an element of disgrace: he was sacked during his annual leave while he was outside the country. Moreover, after his dismissal, Zhuraukou was demoted and is now simply a head of department at the Belarusian State University.
These circumstances raise questions regarding the fate of Zhuraukou’s legacy, the most important aspect of which was Belarus’s participation in the Bologna Process.
Belarus’s Via Dolorosa and the Bologna process
Belarus joined the Bologna process in May 2015 as part of a phase of soft political liberalisation and rapprochement with the West. However, because the country’s educational system has remained far below the standards set by the Bologna Process, Belarus has committed to implementing a road map of reforms by 2018.
However, many experts have pointed out that the real intentions of the Belarusian authorities go far beyond the goals and principles of the Bologna Process. For example, Vadzim Mažejka has expressed the opinion that in committing to the Roadmap, Belarus aimed to lower the duration of study in order to reduce public spending on education.
Promoting diplomas from Belarusian institutions among foreign students as 'internationally recognised' would also help reduce public expenditure: fees paid by foreign students constitute a significant share of the incomes of Belarusian universities, sometimes exceeding 50 per cent of their budgets.
Imitation of a pro-reformist dialogue with the West has also contributed to the Belarusian authorities’ considerations.
On 13 December 2016 the Ostrogorski Centre co-organised the 4th Annual Dutch-Belarusian-Polish Conference 'Education as a Human Right: Modernising Higher Education to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century'. During the conference, two prominent speakers representing state and non-state positions on education, Dr. Ihar Tsitovich (a vice-rector of the Republican Institute of Higher Education) and Dr. Uladzimir Dunaeu (a member of the Belarusian Independent Bologna Committee), discussed achievements and difficulties in implementing the roadmap.
The two experts revealed the fundamental contradictions between the Belarusian authorities and independent analysts in their approaches to the Bologna Process. The authorities highlight primarily technical steps, such as introducing Diploma Supplements, developing modules and the credits system, and introducing changes in curricula.
Meanwhile, independent experts point to more fundamental principles such as academic freedom, mobility, close cooperation between the business and educational sectors, international cooperation, education based on students’ needs, co-existence between formal, informal, and non-formal education, etc. According to the Belarusian Independent Bologna Committee, in 2015-2016 Belarus implemented only nine per cent of the roadmap. In many spheres, progress has been negligible.
While the fundamental contradictions between the intentions of the Belarusian authorities and the essence of the Bologna Process have become increasingly apparent, its value for the government appears dubious.
During the two years since Belarus joined the Bologna Process, growth in the number of foreign students has remained insignificant: less than 1,000 people, or about seven per cent. Moreover, the number of students from Turkmenistan and China – the largest consumers of Belarusian educational services – has decreased: from 801 to 759 students (China) and from 8,342 to 7,911 students (Turkmenistan).
One major problem lies in the values of the Bologna Process and academic freedoms. A test of the authorities' limits occurred in November-December 2015. A group of students at the Belarusian State University took a stand against the University’s plan to introduce fees for re-sitting examinations. In spite of the insignificance of the case and the wide range of opportunities for dialogue, the authorities nevertheless chose to rely on repression. The rector of the University even refused to meet with the protesting students.
Moreover, in January-February 2016 the Ministry of Education made an attempt to replace the deans of the most ‘oppositional’ faculties, but succeeded in replacing only the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy.
A second problem occurred during the Parliamentary elections in September 2016. In Belarus, no one can claim to really know the results of elections. However, some facts point to the growth of protest voting among students. For example, one opposition candidate and professor at the university, Aleh Trusau, claims to have counted the votes of his students. His figures significantly contradicted the official results.
It seems that Mikhail Zhuraukou’s inability to prevent dissent among students and the poor results of Belarus’s participation in the Bologna Process contributed to his dismissal significantly.
What tasks does the new minister face?
During the appointment of Karpenka, Aliaksandr Lukashenka made a clear statement on his vision for the new minister’s work. According to the president, Karpenka is well acquainted with the ideological pillars of the state. The Communist Party enjoys great support from the authorities, who claim that communist ideology remains relevant for Belarus. In November 2016, the government of Minsk unveiled a new monument to Lenin together with the Communist Party in Minsk.
Karpenka’s biography also raises questions. The new minister of education lacks experience in this sphere. In 2003-2004 he served as vice-rector at the Belarusian State Pedagogical University. He supervised ideological work and social issues, while activities related to education were not part of his responsibilities. In 2004 Karpenka started his public administration career (as a member of Parliament and then as vice-mayor of Minsk) and returned to the sphere of education only in 2016.
Kaprenka is one of a number of critics of Belarus's participation in the Bologna Process. He praises the Soviet educational system, the important role of ideology and forced labour in education, as well as obligatory work placements after graduating. Independent experts, such as Uladzimir Dunaeu, consider Karpenka's appointment 'a step back' for education in Belarus.
However, the most important point concerns the authorities’ general attitude towards the Bologna process. In addition to disappointing results, the government has started to feel insecure about the amount of freedom, or even simply hints of freedom, in the academic sphere. The students protests are a clear example of this. It seems that the authorities would prefer stability over uncertain future economic benefits and a chance of protest.
Thus, it seems that the main tasks for the new minister are to increase control, strength ideology, and prevent the Bologna Process from resulting in any serious transformation.
Top 10 stories on Belarus Digest published in 2016
In 2016 Belarus Digest readers were particularly interested in our articles on security issues and relations of Belarus and Russia.
Other popular stories covered visa policies of Belarus as well as topics such as migration to Poland, potash trade and the 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster.
Belarus Digest team wishes its readers a healthy, productive and happy new year!
Below is our top 10 most read stories published in 2016.
Recently, the Russian Ministry of Defence disclosed logistical data of railway traffic to other countries for the upcoming year. It revealed that the Kremlin is planning to significantly increase the amount of military cargo headed for Belarus. This may be a sign that Moscow is preparing to redeploy a large number of Russian troops to Belarus in 2017.
An earlier piece by Belarus Digest predicted that the Kremlin was trying to transform Belarus into a flash point for menacing NATO and Ukraine by deploying its military capabilities on Belarusian territory. Unfortunately, this prediction is corroborated by the aforementioned logistic data, as well as the fruitlessness of the recent meeting between Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
On 26 October 2016 a new visa-free area along the Augustow Canal, a conservation protection zone in the Hrodna region on the border with Poland and Lithuania became effective. Tourists will also be able to visit adjacent districts of Hrodna region as well as the city of Hrodna (population 300,000) visa-free, an unprecedented measure in the history of sovereign Belarus.The visa-free regime will last until 31 December 2017. This will make it the second visa-free zone in Belarus after the national park Bielaviežskaja Pušča opened up in 2015; foreign citizens can stay in the forest for up to three days.
These initiatives appear to be an experiment before Belarusian authorities implement a more comprehensive simplification of the visa regime: future plans also include the long awaited authorisation of local border traffic. Belarusian authorities have long overlooked tourism as a source of profit, but the crisis in traditional industries has forced them to consider this option.
Since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict began, the Kremlin has persistently tried to expand its control over Belarus, a process that has had quite the opposite effect as Belarusian government policy became more independent in 2014-2015. There has always existed a paradox in the simultaneous contingence and estrangement in Belarusian-Russian relations.
Estrangement looks the stronger of the two today, evidenced by the decrease in Belarus’ military dependence on Russia and its refusal to allow the establishment of a Russian military base on its territory; the reduction in the Russian economy’s role in Belarus; discrepancies in the foreign policy and media spheres; and conflicts between the political elites of both countries.
On 28 January the Polish Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers proposed granting residence permits to a million migrants currently in Poland. The majority of them are Ukrainians, followed by Belarusians and Vietnamese. In recent years Poland has been aiming its immigration policy at absorbing a young labour force from the regions of former Polish rule, and has created unique preferences for foreign citizens in the form of the Card of the Pole.
The card gives its holder the right to work and study in Poland, and later to obtain Polish citizenship. Many Belarusians see it as an opportunity to work and study in Poland with the prospect of getting EU citizenship in the conditions of the ongoing economic crisis. The authorities of Belarus definitely dislike the initiative, but have proved unable to counter it so far.
5. 2016 Will Be Tough, Reforms Or No Reforms – Digest Of Belarusian Economy by Kateryna Bornukova
After several years of slow growth, 2015 became the first year of true recession. GDP fell by 3.9 per cent in January-November; employment declined over the year. The Belarusian rouble depreciated by almost 60 per cent.
Despite significant changes in the economic policy, 2016 will not be different. The official outlook (based on the oil price of $50) predicts zero growth, while the independent research centres expect modest decline. The recession is not deep enough to launch reforms quickly, and the positive effects from any possible reforms will come in only after 2016-2017.
On 14-20 September 2016 the Belarusian Armed Forces conducted large-scale military drills. Despite the fact that these military exercises were planned, they demonstrate a significant shift in security policy as Minsk increasingly takes into consideration possible risks and challenges from Russia.
It seems that the Belarusian Armed Forces are preparing for a possible Donbass-like hybrid conflict in light of increasing pressure from the Kremlin.
On 22 January, President Alexander Lukashenka approved changes to Belarus' military doctrine. This document reveals fundamental changes in the mindset of the Belarusian establishment. Learning Ukrainian lessons, Minsk is putting issues of military security at the top of its priority list.
Belarusian strategists have also identified which threats are to be countered. They include violent political changes, which Minsk suspects may come from Ukraine and pro-Moscow forces' attempts to repeat in Belarus their exploits in Ukraine.
Minsk is also reevaluating its alliance with Russia. The Kremlin for years ignored Minsk's interests and is embarking on an increasingly chauvinist path. Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin criticised Soviet-era international borders as 'arbitrary', implying that they could be changed through a Crimea- or Donbas-like scenario.
Belarus has managed to persuade Russia to supply it with arms and renounce plans for a Russian air base on Belarusian territory.
The Belarusian official military daily newspaper admitted at the end of December that some (apparently four) Russian aircraft are still stationed in Baranavichy. But Minsk has managed to postpone or even cancelled Russian plans for an air base in Belarus. To do so Minsk was forced to finally invest in the overhaul and modernisation of its fighter aircraft. That was completed in November.
This will help Belarus not only to avoid a Russian air base being established in the country and to receive Russian equipment for the army; it will also help convince Moscow that its Belarusian ally possesses real force. Minsk has strengthened its position in any negotiations with Russia and made clear its readiness to defy any attempts to undermine the Belarusian state.
June 2016 became a breakthrough month for the potash industry in Belarus. The state-owned company “Belaruskali” managed to sign two long-awaited contracts with two major potash consumers – India and Bangladesh. However, the main news came from China: on June 17 Belarus received a $1,4bn loan from the China Development Bank for construction of a new mining and processing factory.
The parties reached this agreement after negotiations lasting more than one year. Although Belarus and China provided no information about a new potash contract, the very fact of this loan's existence provides grounds to suggest that such deal has been concluded.
On 26 April 1986, an explosion at Charnobyl Nuclear Power Plant released huge amounts of radiation into the atmosphere contaminating large territories of Europe. Belarus ended up the most badly affected taking 70% of the fallout from the power plant.
The Soviet Union sought to cover up the accident. The news about the explosion came out only two days later, after Sweden registered an increase in radiation levels on its territory. The evacuation of the population in the immediate vicinity of the plant began only several days later.
Although the power plant was located in the Ukrainian town of Prypyac, two thirds of the fallout landed on Belarusian territory. Photographer Siarhei Leskiec documents life in the contaminated parts of Belarus today, thirty years after what is considered the worst nuclear plant accident in history.